INDEX TO REPORT ON FORM 20-F
PART I
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|
|
Item 1.
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Identity of Directors, Senior Management and Advisers
|
2
|
Item 2.
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Offer Statistics and Expected Timetable
|
2
|
Item 3.
|
Key Information
|
2
|
Item 4.
|
Information on the Company
|
20
|
Item 4A.
|
Unresolved Staff Comments
|
35
|
Item 5.
|
Operating and Financial Review and Prospects
|
35
|
Item 6.
|
Directors, Senior Management and Employees
|
56
|
Item 7.
|
Major Shareholders and Related Party Transactions
|
59
|
Item 8.
|
Financial Information
|
61
|
Item 9.
|
The Offer and Listing
|
62
|
Item 10.
|
Additional Information
|
63
|
Item 11.
|
Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk
|
72
|
Item 12.
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Description of Securities other than Equity Securities
|
72
|
|
|
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PART II
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|
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Item 13.
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Defaults, Dividend Arrearages and Delinquencies
|
72
|
Item 14.
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Material Modifications to the Rights of Security Holders and Use of Proceeds
|
72
|
Item 15.
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Controls and Procedures
|
72
|
Item 16.
|
Reserved
|
73
|
Item 16A.
|
Audit Committee Financial Expert
|
73
|
Item 16B.
|
Code of Ethics
|
74
|
Item 16C.
|
Principal Accountant Fees and Services
|
74
|
Item 16D.
|
Exemptions from the Listing Standards for Audit Committees
|
74
|
Item 16E.
|
Purchases of Equity Securities by the Issuer and Affiliated Purchasers
|
74
|
Item 16F.
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Change in Registrant's Certifying Accountant
|
74
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Item 16G.
|
Corporate Governance
|
75
|
|
|
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PART III
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|
|
Item 17.
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Financial Statements
|
76
|
Item 18.
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Financial Statements
|
76
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Item 19.
|
Exhibits
|
77
|
CAUTIONARY STATEMENT REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
Matters discussed in this report and the documents incorporated by reference may constitute forward-looking statements. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides safe harbor protections for forward-looking statements, which include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts.
Frontline Ltd. and its subsidiaries, or the Company, desires to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and is including this cautionary statement in connection with this safe harbor legislation. This report and any other written or oral statements made by us or on our behalf may include forward-looking statements, which reflect our current views with respect to future events and financial performance. The words "believe," "anticipate," "intend," "estimate," "forecast," "project," "plan," "potential," "will," "may," "should," "expect" and similar expressions identify forward-looking statements.
The forward-looking statements in this report are based upon various assumptions, including without limitation, management's examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and data available from third parties. Although we believe that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, we cannot assure you that we will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. We undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
In addition to these important factors and matters discussed elsewhere herein and in the documents incorporated by reference herein, important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include the strength of world economies, fluctuations in currencies and interest rates, general market conditions, including fluctuations in charterhire rates and vessel values, changes in demand in the tanker and dry bulk markets, changes in world wide oil production and consumption and storage, changes in the Company's operating expenses, including bunker prices, drydocking and insurance costs, the market for the Company's vessels, availability of financing and refinancing, changes in governmental rules and regulations or actions taken by regulatory authorities, potential liability from pending or future litigation, general domestic and international political conditions, potential disruption of shipping routes due to accidents, political events or acts by terrorists, and other important factors described from time to time in the reports filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission or Commission.
PART I
ITEM 1.
|
IDENTITY OF DIRECTORS, SENIOR MANAGEMENT AND ADVISERS
|
Not applicable.
ITEM 2.
|
OFFER STATISTICS AND EXPECTED TIMETABLE
|
Not applicable.
Throughout this report, the "Company," "we," "us" and "our" all refer to Frontline Ltd. and its subsidiaries. We use the term deadweight ton, or dwt, in describing the size of vessels. Dwt, expressed in metric tons, each of which is equivalent to 1,000 kilograms, refers to the maximum weight of cargo and supplies that a vessel can carry. The Company operates tankers of two sizes: very large crude carriers, or VLCCs, which are between 200,000 and 320,000 deadweight tons, or dwt, and Suezmax tankers, which are vessels between 120,000 and 170,000 dwt. We also operate oil/bulk/ore or OBO carriers, which are currently classified to carry dry cargo. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "USD","US$" and "$" in this report are U.S. dollars.
A. SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA
The selected statement of operations data of the Company with respect to the fiscal years ended December 31, 2010, 2009 and 2008 and the selected balance sheet data of the Company with respect to the fiscal years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009, respectively, have been derived from the Company's consolidated financial statements included herein and should be read in conjunction with such statements and the notes thereto. The selected statement of operations data with respect to the fiscal years ended December 31, 2007 and 2006 and the selected balance sheet data with respect to the fiscal years ended December 31, 2008, 2007 and 2006 have been derived from consolidated financial statements of the Company not included herein. The following table should also be read in conjunction with Item 5. "Operating and Financial Review and Prospects" and the Company's consolidated financial statements and notes thereto included herein. The Company's accounts are maintained in U.S. dollars.
|
|
Fiscal year ended December 31,
|
|
|
|
2010
|
|
|
2009
|
|
|
2008
|
|
|
2007
|
|
|
2006
|
|
(in thousands of $, except ordinary shares, per share data and ratios)
|
|
Statement of Operations Data (1):
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total operating revenues
|
|
|
1,165,215
|
|
|
|
1,133,286
|
|
|
|
2,104,018
|
|
|
|
1,299,927
|
|
|
|
1,558,369
|
|
Total operating expenses
|
|
|
888,238
|
|
|
|
896,237
|
|
|
|
1,395,831
|
|
|
|
898,904
|
|
|
|
850,623
|
|
Net operating income
|
|
|
307,912
|
|
|
|
240,110
|
|
|
|
850,480
|
|
|
|
519,191
|
|
|
|
803,401
|
|
Net income from continuing operations before income taxes and noncontrolling interest
|
|
|
164,222
|
|
|
|
105,833
|
|
|
|
701,264
|
|
|
|
503,991
|
|
|
|
661,330
|
|
Net income from continuing operations
|
|
|
164,004
|
|
|
|
105,472
|
|
|
|
700,954
|
|
|
|
587,138
|
|
|
|
661,168
|
|
Discontinued operations (2)
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
5,442
|
|
|
|
13,514
|
|
Net income attributable to Frontline Ltd.
|
|
|
161,407
|
|
|
|
102,701
|
|
|
|
698,770
|
|
|
|
570,418
|
|
|
|
516,000
|
|
Earnings from continuing operations per ordinary share
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- basic
|
|
$
|
2.07
|
|
|
$
|
1.32
|
|
|
$
|
9.15
|
|
|
$
|
7.55
|
|
|
$
|
6.72
|
|
- diluted
|
|
$
|
2.07
|
|
|
$
|
1.32
|
|
|
$
|
9.14
|
|
|
$
|
7.55
|
|
|
$
|
6.72
|
|
Net income per ordinary share
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- basic
|
|
$
|
2.07
|
|
|
$
|
1.32
|
|
|
$
|
9.15
|
|
|
$
|
7.62
|
|
|
$
|
6.90
|
|
- diluted
|
|
$
|
2.07
|
|
|
$
|
1.32
|
|
|
$
|
9.14
|
|
|
$
|
7.62
|
|
|
$
|
6.90
|
|
Cash dividends declared per share
|
|
$
|
2.00
|
|
|
$
|
0.90
|
|
|
$
|
8.25
|
|
|
$
|
8.30
|
|
|
$
|
7.00
|
|
|
|
Fiscal year ended December 31,
|
|
|
|
2010
|
|
|
2009
|
|
|
2008
|
|
|
2007
|
|
|
2006
|
|
(in thousands of $, except ordinary shares and ratios)
|
|
Balance Sheet Data (at end of year) (1):
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cash and cash equivalents
|
|
|
176,639
|
|
|
|
82,575
|
|
|
|
190,819
|
|
|
|
168,432
|
|
|
|
197,181
|
|
Newbuildings
|
|
|
224,319
|
|
|
|
413,968
|
|
|
|
454,227
|
|
|
|
160,298
|
|
|
|
166,851
|
|
Vessels and equipment, net
|
|
|
1,430,124
|
|
|
|
678,694
|
|
|
|
438,161
|
|
|
|
208,516
|
|
|
|
2,446,278
|
|
Vessels and equipment under capital lease, net
|
|
|
1,427,526
|
|
|
|
1,740,666
|
|
|
|
2,100,717
|
|
|
|
2,324,789
|
|
|
|
626,374
|
|
Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and associated companies
|
|
|
3,408
|
|
|
|
3,923
|
|
|
|
4,467
|
|
|
|
5,633
|
|
|
|
17,825
|
|
Total assets
|
|
|
3,797,920
|
|
|
|
3,715,218
|
|
|
|
4,027,728
|
|
|
|
3,762,091
|
|
|
|
4,589,937
|
|
Short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt
|
|
|
173,595
|
|
|
|
123,884
|
|
|
|
293,471
|
|
|
|
96,811
|
|
|
|
281,409
|
|
Current portion of obligations under capital lease
|
|
|
193,379
|
|
|
|
285,753
|
|
|
|
243,293
|
|
|
|
179,604
|
|
|
|
28,857
|
|
Long-term debt
|
|
|
1,190,763
|
|
|
|
760,698
|
|
|
|
614,676
|
|
|
|
376,723
|
|
|
|
2,181,885
|
|
Obligations under capital leases
|
|
|
1,336,908
|
|
|
|
1,579,708
|
|
|
|
1,969,919
|
|
|
|
2,318,794
|
|
|
|
723,073
|
|
Share capital
|
|
|
194,646
|
|
|
|
194,646
|
|
|
|
194,646
|
|
|
|
187,063
|
|
|
|
187,063
|
|
Total stockholders' equity
|
|
|
747,133
|
|
|
|
741,340
|
|
|
|
702,217
|
|
|
|
445,969
|
|
|
|
668,560
|
|
Ordinary shares outstanding
|
|
|
77,858,502
|
|
|
|
77,858,502
|
|
|
|
77,858,502
|
|
|
|
74,825,169
|
|
|
|
74,825,169
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Weighted average ordinary shares outstanding
|
|
|
77,858,502
|
|
|
|
77,858,502
|
|
|
|
76,352,673
|
|
|
|
74,825,169
|
|
|
|
74,825,169
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other Financial Data:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Equity to assets ratio (percentage) (3)
|
|
|
19.7
|
%
|
|
|
20.0
|
%
|
|
|
17.4
|
%
|
|
|
11.8
|
%
|
|
|
14.6
|
%
|
Debt to equity ratio (4)
|
|
|
3.9
|
|
|
|
3.7
|
|
|
|
4.4
|
|
|
|
6.7
|
|
|
|
4.8
|
|
Price earnings ratio (5)
|
|
|
12.3
|
|
|
|
20.7
|
|
|
|
3.2
|
|
|
|
6.3
|
|
|
|
4.6
|
|
Time charter equivalent revenue (6)
|
|
|
861,829
|
|
|
|
896,843
|
|
|
|
1,493,912
|
|
|
|
938,960
|
|
|
|
1,154,029
|
|
Notes:
|
1.
|
The Company distributed the majority of its remaining shareholding in Ship Finance International Limited ("Ship Finance") in March 2007 and no longer consolidates Ship Finance as of March 31, 2007. A summary of the major changes to the financial statements is as follows;
|
|
a.
|
Vessels leased from Ship Finance, which were previously reported as wholly owned, are reported as vessels held under capital lease.
|
|
b.
|
Capital lease obligations with Ship Finance, which were previously eliminated on consolidation are reported as liabilities with the related interest recorded in the income statement.
|
|
c.
|
Debt incurred by Ship Finance, which was previously reported as debt of the Company, is no longer reported.
|
|
d.
|
Derivative instruments held by Ship Finance are no longer reported.
|
|
e.
|
Noncontrolling interest expense relating to Ship Finance is no longer reported.
|
|
f.
|
Profit share expense relating to amounts due to Ship Finance is shown in the income statement.
|
|
g.
|
Results from Ship Finance's container ships, jack-up rigs and Panamax vessels are no longer reported in the Company's consolidated results.
|
|
2.
|
The Company disposed of the container vessel and rig operations of Ship Finance in the first quarter of 2007 as a result of the spin off of Ship Finance. These operations have been recorded as discontinued operations in 2007 and 2006.
|
|
3.
|
Equity-to-assets ratio is calculated as total stockholders' equity divided by total assets.
|
|
4.
|
Debt-to-equity ratio is calculated as total interest bearing current and long-term liabilities, including obligations under capital leases, divided by stockholders' equity.
|
|
5.
|
Price earnings ratio is calculated by dividing the closing year end share price by basic earnings per share.
|
|
6.
|
A reconciliation of time charter equivalent revenues to total operating revenues as reflected in the consolidated statements of operations is as follows:
|
|
|
2010
|
|
|
2009
|
|
|
2008
|
|
|
2007
|
|
|
2006
|
|
(in thousands of $)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total operating revenues
|
|
|
1,165,215
|
|
|
|
1,133,286
|
|
|
|
2,104,018
|
|
|
|
1,299,927
|
|
|
|
1,558,369
|
|
Less:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other income
|
|
|
(20,678
|
)
|
|
|
(17,068
|
)
|
|
|
(17,918
|
)
|
|
|
(8,516
|
)
|
|
|
(5,294
|
)
|
Voyage expense
|
|
|
(282,708
|
)
|
|
|
(219,375
|
)
|
|
|
(592,188
|
)
|
|
|
(352,451
|
)
|
|
|
(399,046
|
)
|
Time charter equivalent revenue
|
|
|
861,829
|
|
|
|
896,843
|
|
|
|
1,493,912
|
|
|
|
938,960
|
|
|
|
1,154,029
|
|
Consistent with general practice in the shipping industry, the Company uses time charter equivalent revenue, which represents operating revenues less voyage expenses, as a measure to compare revenue generated from a voyage charter to revenue generated from a time charter. Time charter equivalent revenue, a non-GAAP measure, provides additional meaningful information in conjunction with operating revenues, the most directly comparable GAAP measure, because it assists Company management in making decisions regarding the deployment and use of its vessels and in evaluating the Company's financial performance.
B. CAPITALIZATION AND INDEBTEDNESS
Not applicable.
C. REASONS FOR THE OFFER AND USE OF PROCEEDS
Not applicable.
D. RISK FACTORS
We are engaged in the seaborne transportation of crude oil, oil products and dry bulk cargoes. The following summarizes some of the risks that may materially affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. As our OBOs are currently fitted to carry dry bulk cargoes, we include risk factors related to dry bulk vessels.
Risks Related to Our Industry
Tankers
If the tanker industry, which historically has been cyclical, is depressed in the future, our earnings and available cash flow may be adversely affected
Historically, the tanker industry has been highly cyclical, with volatility in profitability and asset values resulting from changes in the supply of, and demand for, tanker capacity. Charter rates are still relatively low compared to the rates achieved in the years preceding the global financial crisis, and the recent upward trend in charter rates since the historical lows reached in 2009 may be short lived. These factors may adversely affect the rates payable and the amounts we receive in respect of our vessels operating in tanker pools, as well as our ability to recharter any non-pooled vessels we may have in the future. Our ability to charter our vessels on the expiration or termination of their current spot and time and bareboat charters and the charter rates payable under any renewal or replacement charters will depend upon, among other things, economic conditions in the tanker market. Fluctuations in charter rates and tanker values result from changes in the supply and demand for tanker capacity. According to industry sources, newbuilding orders for oil tankers in 2010 increased from their relatively low levels in 2009.
The factors that influence demand for tanker capacity include:
|
·
|
supply and demand for oil and oil products;
|
|
·
|
global and regional economic and political conditions, including developments in international trade and fluctuations in industrial and agricultural production;
|
|
·
|
regional availability of refining capacity;
|
|
·
|
environmental and other legal and regulatory developments;
|
|
·
|
the distance oil and oil products are to be moved by sea;
|
|
·
|
changes in seaborne and other transportation patterns, including changes in the distances over which tanker cargoes are transported by sea;
|
|
·
|
currency exchange rates;
|
|
·
|
weather and acts of God and natural disasters, including hurricanes and typhoons;
|
|
·
|
competition from alternative sources of energy and from other shipping companies and other modes of transport; and
|
|
·
|
international sanctions, embargoes, import and export restrictions, nationalizations, piracy and wars.
|
The factors that influence the supply of tanker capacity include:
|
·
|
current and expected purchase orders for tankers;
|
|
·
|
the number of tanker newbuilding deliveries;
|
|
·
|
the scrapping rate of older tankers;
|
|
·
|
the successful implementation of the phase-out of single-hull tankers;
|
|
·
|
technological advances in tanker design and capacity;
|
|
·
|
tanker freight rates, which are affected by factors that may effect the rate of newbuilding, swapping and laying up of tankers;
|
|
·
|
price of steel and vessel equipment;
|
|
·
|
conversion of tankers to other uses or conversion of other vessels to tankers;
|
|
·
|
the number of tankers that are out of service; and
|
|
·
|
changes in environmental and other regulations that may limit the useful lives of tankers.
|
The factors affecting the supply and demand for tankers have been volatile and are outside of our control, and the nature, timing and degree of changes in industry conditions are unpredictable, including those discussed above.
The international tanker industry has experienced volatile charter rates and vessel values and there can be no assurance that these charter rates and vessel values will return to their previous high levels
Charter rates in the tanker industry are volatile. We anticipate that future demand for our vessels, and in turn our future charter rates, will be dependent upon economic growth in the world's economy as well as seasonal and regional changes in demand and changes in the capacity of the world's fleet. We believe that these charter rates are the result of economic growth in the world economy that exceeds growth in global vessel capacity. There can be no assurance that economic growth will not stagnate or decline leading to a further decrease in vessel values and charter rates. A further decline in vessel values and charter rates could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operation and ability to pay dividends.
Any decrease in shipments of crude oil may adversely affect our financial performance
The demand for our oil tankers derives primarily from demand for Arabian Gulf, West African, North Sea and Carribean crude oil, which, in turn, primarily depends on the economies of the world's industrial countries and competition from alternative energy sources. A wide range of economic, social and other factors can significantly affect the strength of the world's industrial economies and their demand for crude oil from the mentioned geographical areas. One such factor is the price of worldwide crude oil. The world's oil markets have experienced high levels of volatility in the last 25 years. In July 2008, oil prices rose to a high of approximately $143 per barrel before decreasing to approximately $38 per barrel by the end of December 2008 and rising to approximately $92 by the end of December 2010.
Any decrease in shipments of crude oil from the above mentioned geographical areas would have a material adverse effect on our financial performance. Among the factors which could lead to such a decrease are:
|
·
|
increased crude oil production from other areas;
|
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increased refining capacity in the Arabian Gulf or West Africa;
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increased use of existing and future crude oil pipelines in the Arabian Gulf or West Africa;
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a decision by Arabian Gulf or West African oil-producing nations to increase their crude oil prices or to further decrease or limit their crude oil production;
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armed conflict in the Arabian Gulf and West Africa and political or other factors; and
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the development and the relative costs of nuclear power, natural gas, coal and other alternative sources of energy.
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An over-supply of tanker capacity may lead to reductions in charter rates, vessel values and profitability
In recent years, shipyards have produced a large number of new tankers. If the capacity of new vessels delivered exceeds the capacity of tankers being scrapped and converted to non-trading tankers, tanker capacity will increase. If the supply of tanker capacity increases and the demand for tanker capacity does not increase correspondingly, charter rates could materially decline. A reduction in charter rates and the value of our vessels may have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, our ability to pay dividends and our compliance with loan covenants.
Dry Bulk
Charter hire rates for dry bulk vessels may decrease in the future, which may adversely affect our earnings
The dry bulk shipping industry is cyclical with attendant volatility in charterhire rates and profitability. The degree of charterhire rate volatility among different types of dry bulk vessels has varied widely, and charterhire rates for dry bulk vessels have declined significantly from historically high levels. Fluctuations in charter rates result from changes in the supply and demand for vessel capacity and changes in the supply and demand for the major commodities carried by water internationally. Because the factors affecting the supply and demand for vessels are outside of our control and are unpredictable, the nature, timing, direction and degree of changes in industry conditions are also unpredictable.
Factors that influence demand for vessel capacity include:
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supply and demand for energy resources, commodities, semi-finished and finished consumer and industrial products;
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changes in the exploration or production of energy resources, commodities, semi-finished and finished consumer and industrial products;
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the location of regional and global exploration, production and manufacturing facilities;
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the location of consuming regions for energy resources, commodities, semi-finished and finished consumer and industrial products;
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the globalization of production and manufacturing;
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global and regional economic and political conditions, including armed conflicts and terrorist activities; embargoes and strikes;
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developments in international trade;
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changes in seaborne and other transportation patterns, including the distance cargo is transported by sea;
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environmental and other regulatory developments;
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currency exchange rates; and
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Factors that influence the supply of vessel capacity include:
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number of newbuilding deliveries;
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scrapping of older vessels;
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number of vessels that are out of service.
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Demand for our dry bulk vessels is dependent upon economic growth in the world's economies, seasonal and regional changes in demand, changes in the capacity of the global dry bulk fleet and the sources and supply of dry bulk cargo transported by sea. Given the large number of new dry bulk carriers currently on order with shipyards, the capacity of the global dry bulk carrier fleet seems likely to increase and economic growth may not resume in areas that have experienced a recession or continue in other areas. Adverse economic, political, social or other developments could have a material adverse effect on our business and operating results.
A continued downturn in the dry bulk carrier charter market may have an adverse effect on our earnings and our ability to comply with our loan covenants
The abrupt and dramatic downturn in the dry bulk charter market has severely affected the dry bulk shipping industry. The Baltic Dry Index, an index published by The Baltic Exchange of shipping rates for 20 key dry bulk routes, fell 94% from a peak of 11,793 in May 2008 to a low of 663 in December 2008. During 2009, the BDI remained volatile, reaching a low of 772 on January 5, 2009 and a high of 4,661 on November 19, 2009. The BDI came under pressure in December 2009 and January 2010, reaching a low of 2,571 on February 12, 2010 as stalled iron ore pricing negotiations added uncertainty to the freight markets. The index then staged a modest recovery based on strong demand for commodities from Asia and a recovering global market, but it has remained somewhat volatile due to increases in vessel supply. As of the end of December 2010, the index stood at 1,773. This downturn in dry bulk charter rates and their volatility, which has resulted from the economic dislocation worldwide and the disruption of the credit markets, have had a number of adverse consequences for dry bulk shipping, including, among other things:
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an absence of financing for vessels;
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no active second-hand market for the sale of vessels;
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extremely low charter rates, particularly for vessels employed in the spot market;
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widespread loan covenant defaults in the dry bulk shipping industry; and
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declaration of bankruptcy by some operators and ship owners as well as charterers.
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The occurrence of one or more of these events could adversely affect our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends. There can be no assurance that the dry bulk charter market will recover over the next several months and the market could continue to decline further.
Dry bulk carrier values have also declined both as a result of a slowdown in the availability of global credit and the significant deterioration in charter rates. Charter rates and vessel values have been affected in part by the lack of availability of credit to finance both vessel purchases and purchases of commodities carried by sea, resulting in a decline in cargo shipments, and the excess supply of iron ore in China, which resulted in falling iron ore prices and increased stockpiles in Chinese ports. There can be no assurance as to how long charter rates and vessel values will remain at their currently low levels or whether the recent improvement will continue. Charter rates may remain at low levels for some time which will adversely affect our revenue and profitability.
In addition, because the market value of our vessels may fluctuate significantly, we may incur losses when we sell vessels, which may adversely affect our earnings. If we sell vessels at a time when vessel prices have fallen and before we have recorded an impairment adjustment to our financial statements, the sale may be at less than the vessel's carrying amount in our financial statements, resulting in a loss and a reduction in earnings.
An oversupply of dry bulk carrier capacity may lead to reductions in charterhire rates and profitability
The market supply of dry bulk carriers has been increasing as a result of the delivery of numerous newbuilding orders over the last few years. Newbuildings were delivered in increasing numbers starting at the beginning of 2006 and continued to be delivered in increasing numbers from 2007 through 2010.
An oversupply of dry bulk carrier capacity may result in a reduction of charterhire rates, as evidenced by historically low rates in December 2008. If such dry bulk carrier capacity increase continues, we may only be able to charter our vessels at reduced or unprofitable rates, or we may not be able to charter these vessels at all. The occurrence of these events could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends.
Shipping Generally
Risks involved with operating ocean-going vessels could affect our business and reputation, which could have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition
The operation of an ocean-going vessel carries inherent risks. These risks include the possibility of:
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environmental accidents;
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cargo and property losses or damage; and
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business interruptions caused by mechanical failure, human error, war, terrorism, piracy, political action in various countries, labor strikes, or adverse weather conditions.
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Any of these circumstances or events could increase our costs or lower our revenues. The involvement of our vessels in an oil spill or other environmental disaster may harm our reputation as a safe and reliable tanker operator.
The current global economic downturn may negatively impact our business
In recent years, operating businesses in the global economy have faced tightening credit, weakening demand for goods and services, deteriorating international liquidity conditions, and declining markets. At times, lower demand for dry bulk cargoes and crude oil as well as diminished trade credit available for the delivery of such dry bulk cargoes and crude oil have led to decreased demand for dry bulk vessels and tankers, respectively, creating downward pressure on charter rates. Although vessel values have stabilized over the past few months, general market volatility has resulted from uncertainty about sovereign debt and fears of countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain defaulting on their governments' financial obligations. If the current global economic environment persists or worsens, we may be negatively affected in the following ways:
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we may not be able to employ our vessels at charter rates as favorable to us as historical rates or operate our vessels profitably; and
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the market value of our vessels could decrease, which may cause us to recognize losses if any of our vessels are sold or if their values are impaired.
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The occurrence of any of the foregoing could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends.
Acts of piracy on ocean-going vessels could adversely affect our business
Acts of piracy have historically affected ocean-going vessels trading in regions of the world such as the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. Throughout 2009 and 2010, the frequency of piracy incidents increased significantly, particularly in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. If these piracy attacks result in regions in which our vessels are deployed being characterized by insurers as "war risk" zones, or Joint War Committee (JWC) "war and strikes" listed areas, premiums payable for such coverage could increase significantly and such insurance coverage may be more difficult to obtain. In addition, crew costs, including costs which may be incurred to the extent we employ onboard security guards, could increase in such circumstances. We may not be adequately insured to cover losses from these incidents, which could have a material adverse effect on us. In addition, detention hijacking as a result of an act of piracy against our vessels, or an increase in cost, or unavailability of insurance for our vessels, could have a material adverse impact on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends.
World events could affect our results of operations and financial condition
Terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, in London on July 7, 2005 and in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 and the continuing response of the United States and others to these attacks, as well as the threat of future terrorist attacks in the United States or elsewhere, continues to cause uncertainty in the world's financial markets and may affect our business, operating results and financial condition. The continuing presence of United States and other armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan may lead to additional acts of terrorism and armed conflict around the world including North Africa may contribute to further economic instability in the global financial markets and may affect our business, operating results and financial condition. These uncertainties could also adversely affect our ability to obtain additional financing on terms acceptable to us or at all. In the past, political conflicts have also resulted in attacks on vessels, mining of waterways and other efforts to disrupt international shipping, particularly in the Arabian Gulf region. Acts of terrorism and piracy have also affected vessels trading in regions such as the South China Sea and the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. Any of these occurrences could have a material adverse impact on our operating results, revenues and costs.
Terrorist attacks on vessels, such as the October 2002 attack on the M.V. Limburg, a very large crude carrier not related to us, may in the future also negatively affect our operations and financial condition and directly impact our vessels or our customers. Future terrorist attacks could result in increased volatility and turmoil of the financial markets in the United States and globally. Any of these occurrences, or the perception that our vessels are potential terrorist targets, could have a material adverse impact on our revenues and costs.
The recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan may have an adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition and ability to pay dividends
Japan is one of the world's leading importers of oil and dry bulk commodities. The earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011 have caused an estimated $180 billion of damage and have threatened to send the Japanese economy into a recession. As of the date of this annual report, the extent to which the earthquake and tsunami will affect the international shipping industry is unclear. A prolonged recovery period coupled with a relatively stagnant Japanese economy could decrease oil and dry bulk imports to the world's third-largest economy. This, in turn, could have a material adverse effect on our business and results of operations.
If our vessels call on ports located in countries that are subject to restrictions imposed by the U.S. or other governments, that could adversely affect our reputation and the market for our common stock
From time to time on charterers' instructions, our vessels may call on ports located in Iran, which is a country subject to sanctions and embargoes imposed by the United States government and a country identified by the U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism. The U.S. sanctions and embargo laws and regulations vary in their application, as they do not all apply to the same covered persons or proscribe the same activities, and such sanctions and embargo laws and regulations may be amended or strengthened over time. With effect from July 1, 2010, the U.S. enacted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act ("CISADA"), which expanded the scope of the former Iran Sanctions Act. Among other things, CISADA expands the application of the prohibitions to non-U.S. companies, such as our company, and introduces limits on the ability of companies and persons to do business or trade with Iran when such activities relate to the investment, supply or export of refined petroleum or petroleum products. Although we believe that we are in compliance with all applicable sanctions and embargo laws and regulations, and intend to maintain such compliance, there can be no assurance that we will be in compliance in the future, particularly as the scope of certain laws may be unclear and may be subject to changing interpretations. Any such violation could result in fines or other penalties and could result in some investors deciding, or being required, to divest their interest, or not to invest, in our company. Additionally, some investors may decide to divest their interest, or not to invest, in our company simply because we do business with companies that do business in sanctioned countries. Moreover, our charterers may violate applicable sanctions and embargo laws and regulations as a result of actions that do not involve us or our vessels, and those violations could in turn negatively affect our reputation. Investor perception of the value of our common stock may also be adversely affected by the consequences of war, the effects of terrorism, civil unrest and governmental actions in these and surrounding countries.
Compliance with safety and other vessel requirements imposed by classification societies may be costly and could reduce our net cash flows and net income
The hull and machinery of every commercial vessel must be certified as being "in class" by a classification society authorized by its country of registry. The classification society certifies that a vessel is safe and seaworthy in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations of the country of registry of the vessel and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention.
A vessel must undergo annual surveys, intermediate surveys and special surveys. In lieu of a special survey, a vessel's machinery may be placed on a continuous survey cycle, under which the machinery would be surveyed periodically over a five-year period. We expect our vessels to be on special survey cycles for hull inspection and continuous survey cycles for machinery inspection. Every vessel is also required to be drydocked every two and a half to five years for inspection of its underwater parts.
Compliance with the above requirements may result in significant expense. If any vessel does not maintain its class or fails any annual, intermediate or special survey, the vessel will be unable to trade between ports and will be unemployable, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends.
We are subject to complex laws and regulations, including environmental laws and regulations, that can adversely affect our business, results of operations and financial condition
Our operations will be subject to numerous laws and regulations in the form of international conventions and treaties, national, state and local laws and national and international regulations in force in the jurisdictions in which our vessels operate or are registered, which can significantly affect the ownership and operation of our vessels. These requirements include, but are not limited to, the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, or OPA, the International Maritime Organization, or IMO, International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 (as from time to time amended) generally referred to as CLC, the IMO International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 (as from time to time amended), generally referred to as MARPOL, the IMO International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974 (as from time to time amended), generally referred to as SOLAS, the IMO International Convention on Load Lines of 1966 (as from time to time amended) and the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Compliance with such laws and regulations, where applicable, may require installation of costly equipment or operational changes and may affect the resale value or useful lives of our vessels. Compliance with such laws and regulations may require us to obtain certain permits or authorizations prior to commencing operations. Failure to obtain such permits or authorizations could materially impact our business results of operations, financial conditions and ability to pay dividends by delaying or limiting our ability to accept charterers. We may also incur additional costs in order to comply with other existing and future regulatory obligations, including, but not limited to, costs relating to air emissions including greenhouse gases, the management of ballast waters, maintenance and inspection, development and implementation of emergency procedures and insurance coverage or other financial assurance of our ability to address pollution incidents. These costs could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows and financial condition and our available cash. A failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations may result in administrative and civil penalties, criminal sanctions or the suspension or termination of our operations. Environmental laws often impose strict liability for remediation of spills and releases of oil and hazardous substances, which could subject us to liability, without regard to whether we were negligent or at fault. Under OPA, for example, owners, operators and bareboat charterers are jointly and severally strictly liable for the discharge of oil in U.S. waters, including the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone around the United States. An oil spill could also result in significant liability, including fines, penalties, criminal liability and remediation costs for natural resource damages under other international and U.S. Federal, state and local laws, as well as third-party damages, including punitive damages, and could harm our reputation with current or potential charterers of our tankers. We will be required to satisfy insurance and financial responsibility requirements for potential oil (including marine fuel) spills and other pollution incidents. Although our technical manager will arrange for insurance to cover our vessels with respect to certain environmental risks, there can be no assurance that such insurance will be sufficient to cover all such risks or that any claims will not have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
Furthermore, the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and the subsequent release of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, or other events, may result in further regulation of the tanker industry, and modifications to statutory liability schemes, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
Maritime claimants could arrest one or more of our vessels, which could interrupt our cash flow
Crew members, suppliers of goods and services to a vessel, shippers of cargo and other parties may be entitled to a maritime lien against a vessel for unsatisfied debts, claims or damages. In many jurisdictions, a maritime lienholder may enforce its lien by "arresting" or "attaching" a vessel through foreclosure proceedings. The arrest or attachment of one or more of our vessels could result in a significant loss of earnings for the related off-hire period. In addition, in jurisdictions where the "sister ship" theory of liability applies, a claimant may arrest the vessel which is subject to the claimant's maritime lien and any "associated" vessel, which is any vessel owned or controlled by the same owner. In countries with "sister ship" liability laws, claims might be asserted against us or any of our vessels for liabilities of other vessels that we own.
Governments could requisition our vessels during a period of war or emergency resulting in a loss of earnings
A government of a vessel's registry could requisition for title or seize one or more of our vessels. Requisition for title occurs when a government takes control of a vessel and becomes the owner. A government could also requisition one or more of our vessels for hire. Requisition for hire occurs when a government takes control of a vessel and effectively becomes the charterer at dictated charter rates. Generally, requisitions occur during a period of war or emergency. Government requisition of one or more of our vessels could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends.
Risks Related to Our Business
A drop in spot charter rates may provide an incentive for some charterers to default on their charters
When we enter into a time charter, charter rates under that charter are fixed for the term of the charter. If the spot charter rates or short-term time charter rates in the tanker or dry bulk shipping industry, as applicable, become significantly lower than the time charter equivalent rates that some of our charterers are obligated to pay us under our existing charters, the charterers may have incentive to default under that charter or attempt to renegotiate the charter. If our charterers fail to pay their obligations, we would have to attempt to re-charter our vessels at lower charter rates, which would affect our ability to comply with our loan covenants and operate our vessels profitably. If we are not able to comply with our loan covenants and our lenders choose to accelerate our indebtedness and foreclose their liens, we could be required to sell vessels in our fleet and our ability to continue to conduct our business would be impaired.
The operation of dry bulk carriers and tankers each involve certain unique operational risks
The operation of dry bulk carriers has certain unique operational risks. With a dry bulk carrier, the cargo itself and its interaction with the ship can be a risk factor. By their nature, dry bulk cargoes are often heavy, dense, easily shifted, and react badly to water exposure. In addition, dry bulk carriers are often subjected to battering treatment during unloading operations with grabs, jackhammers (to pry encrusted cargoes out of the hold), and small bulldozers. This treatment may cause damage to the dry bulk carrier. Dry bulk carriers damaged due to treatment during unloading procedures may be more susceptible to a breach to the sea. Hull breaches in dry bulk carriers may lead to the flooding of their holds. If a dry bulk carrier suffers flooding in its forward holds, the bulk cargo may become so dense and waterlogged that its pressure may buckle the dry bulk carrier's bulkheads leading to the loss of the dry bulk carrier.
The operation of tankers has unique operational risks associated with the transportation of oil. An oil spill may cause significant environmental damage, and a catastrophic spill could exceed the insurance coverage available. Compared to other types of vessels, tankers are exposed to a higher risk of damage and loss by fire, whether ignited by a terrorist attack, collision, or other cause, due to the high flammability and high volume of the oil transported in tankers.
If we are unable to adequately maintain or safeguard our vessels we may be unable to prevent these events. Any of these circumstances or events could negatively impact our business, financial condition, results of operations. In addition, the loss of any of our vessels could harm our reputation as a safe and reliable vessel owner and operator.
Purchasing and operating previously owned, or secondhand, vessels may result in increased operating costs and vessels off-hire, which could adversely affect our earnings
Our current business strategy includes growth through the acquisition of previously owned vessels. Even following a physical inspection of secondhand vessels prior to purchase, we do not have the same knowledge about their condition and cost of any required (or anticipated) repairs that we would have had if these vessels had been built for and operated exclusively by us. Accordingly, we may not discover defects or other problems with such vessels prior to purchase. Any such hidden defects or problems, when detected may be expensive to repair, and if not detected, may result in accidents or other incidents for which we may become liable to third parties. Also, when purchasing previously owned vessels, we do not receive the benefit of any builder warranties if the vessels we buy are older than one year.
In general, the costs to maintain a vessel in good operating condition increase with the age of the vessel. Older vessels are typically less fuel efficient than more recently constructed vessels due to improvements in engine technology.
Governmental regulations, safety and other equipment standards related to the age of vessels may require expenditures for alterations or the addition of new equipment to some of our vessels and may restrict the type of activities in which these vessels may engage. We cannot assure you that, as our vessels age, market conditions will justify those expenditures or enable us to operate our vessels profitably during the remainder of their useful lives.
The volatility in both dry bulk and tanker charter rates, and vessel values, may affect our ability to comply with various covenants in our loan agreements
Our loan agreements for our borrowings, which are secured by liens on our vessels, contain various financial covenants. Among those covenants are requirements that relate to our financial position, operating performance and liquidity. For example, there are financial covenants that require us to maintain (i) a minimum value adjusted equity that is based, in part, upon the market value of the vessels securing the loans, (ii) minimum levels of free cash, and (iii) a positive working capital. The market value of dry bulk and tanker vessels is sensitive, among other things, to changes in the dry bulk and tanker charter markets, respectively, with vessel values deteriorating in times when dry bulk and tanker charter rates, as applicable, are falling and improving when charter rates are anticipated to rise. Such conditions may result in our not being in compliance with these loan covenants. In such a situation, unless our lenders were willing to provide waivers of covenant compliance or modifications to our covenants, or would be willing to refinance our indebtedness, we may have to sell vessels in our fleet and/or seek to raise additional capital in the equity markets in order to comply with our loan covenants. Furthermore, if the value of our vessels deteriorates significantly, we may have to record an impairment adjustment in our financial statements, which would adversely affect our financial results and further hinder our ability to raise capital.
If we are not in compliance with our covenants and are not able to obtain covenant waivers or modifications, our lenders could require us to post additional collateral, enhance our equity and liquidity, increase our interest payments or pay down our indebtedness to a level where we are in compliance with our loan covenants, sell vessels in our fleet, or they could accelerate our indebtedness, which would impair our ability to continue to conduct our business. In such an event, our auditors may give either an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph relating to the disclosure in the notes to our financial statements as to the substantial doubt of our ability to continue as a going concern, or a qualified, adverse or disclaimer of opinion, which could lead to additional defaults under our loan agreements. If our indebtedness is accelerated, we might not be able to refinance our debt or obtain additional financing and could lose our vessels if our lenders foreclose their liens. In addition, if we find it necessary to sell our vessels at a time when vessel prices are low, we will recognize losses and a reduction in our earnings, which could affect our ability to raise additional capital necessary for us to comply with our loan agreements.
Our ability to obtain additional debt financing may be dependent on the performance of our then-existing charters and the creditworthiness of our charterers
The actual or perceived credit quality of our charterers, and any defaults by them, may materially affect our ability to obtain the additional capital resources required to purchase additional vessels or may significantly increase our costs of obtaining such capital. Our inability to obtain additional financing at anticipated costs or at all may materially affect our results of operation and our ability to implement our business strategy.
Our results of operations are subject to seasonal fluctuations, which may adversely affect our financial condition
We plan to operate our vessels in markets that have historically exhibited seasonal variations in demand and, as a result, charter rates. This seasonality may result in quarter-to-quarter volatility in our operating results, as our vessels will trade in the spot market. Peaks in tanker demand quite often precede seasonal oil consumption peaks, as refiners and suppliers anticipate consumer demand. Seasonal peaks in oil demand can broadly be classified into two main categories: increased demand prior to Northern Hemisphere winters as heating oil consumption increases and increased demand for gasoline prior to the summer driving season in the United States.
Because the market value of our vessels may fluctuate significantly, we may incur losses when we sell vessels which may adversely affect our earnings
The fair market value of vessels may increase and decrease depending on but not limited to the following factors:
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general economic and market conditions affecting the shipping industry;
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competition from other shipping companies;
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types and sizes of vessels;
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other modes of transportation;
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governmental or other regulations;
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prevailing level of charter rates; and
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technological advances.
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During the period a vessel is subject to a charter, we will not be permitted to sell it to take advantage of increases in vessel values without the charterers' agreement. If we sell a vessel at a time when ship prices have fallen, the sale may be at less than the vessel's carrying amount on our financial statements, with the result that we could incur a loss and a reduction in earnings. In addition, if we determine at any time that a vessel's future limited useful life and earnings require us to impair its value on our financial statements, that could result in a charge against our earnings and a reduction of our shareholders' equity. It is possible that the market value of our vessels will decline in the future and this will also have an adverse effect on some of the financial covenants in our loan agreements.
We may be unable to successfully compete with other vessel operators for charters, which could adversely affect our results of operations and financial position
The operation of tankers and dry bulk vessels and transportation of crude and petroleum products and dry bulk cargoes is extremely competitive. Through our operating subsidiaries we compete with other vessel owners (including major oil companies as well as independent companies), and, to a lesser extent, owners of other size vessels. The tanker and dry bulk markets are highly fragmented. It is possible that we could not obtain suitable employment for our vessels, which could adversely affect our results of operations and financial position.
Our time and bareboat charters may limit our ability to benefit from any improvement in charter rates, and at the same time, our revenues may be adversely affected if we do not successfully employ our vessels on the expiration of our charters
Currently, some of our vessels are contractually committed to time and bareboat charters. Although our time and bareboat charters generally provide reliable revenues, they also limit the portion of our fleet available for spot market voyages during an upswing in the tanker industry cycle, when spot market voyages might be more profitable. By the same token, we cannot assure you that we will be able to successfully employ our vessels in the future or renew our existing charters at rates sufficient to allow us to operate our business profitably or meet our obligations. A decline in charter or spot rates or a failure to successfully charter our vessels could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operation and ability to pay dividends.
Delays or defaults by the shipyards in the construction of our newbuildings could increase our expenses and diminish our net income and cash flows
We currently have newbuilding contracts for the construction of a total of five VLCCs with the Chinese shipyard Zhoushan Jinhaiwan Shipyard Co. Ltd, or Jinhaiwan, and two Suezmax vessels with the Chinese shipyard, Jiangsu Rongsheng Heavy Industries Group Co. Ltd., or Rongsheng. These projects are subject to the risk of delay or defaults by the shipyards caused by, among other things, unforeseen quality or engineering problems, work stoppages, weather interference, unanticipated cost increases, delays in receipt of necessary equipment, and inability to obtain the requisite permits or approvals. In accordance with industry practice, in the event the shipyards are unable or unwilling to deliver the vessels, we may not have substantial remedies. Failure to construct or deliver the ships by the shipyards or any significant delays could increase our expenses and diminish our net income and cash flows.
We cannot assure you that we will be able to refinance indebtedness incurred under our current credit facilities
We cannot assure you that we will be able to refinance our indebtedness on terms that are acceptable to us or at all. If we are not able to refinance our indebtedness, we will have to dedicate a greater portion of our cash flow from operations to pay the principal and interest of this indebtedness. We cannot assure you that we will be able to generate cash flow in amounts that are sufficient for these purposes. If we are not able to satisfy these obligations, we may have to undertake alternative financing plans or sell our assets. In addition, debt service payments under our credit facilities may limit funds otherwise available for working capital, capital expenditures, payment of dividends and other purposes. If we are unable to meet our debt obligations, or if we otherwise default under our credit facilities, our lenders could declare the debt, together with accrued interest and fees, to be immediately due and payable and foreclose on our fleet, which could result in the acceleration of other indebtedness that we may have at such time and the commencement of similar foreclosure proceedings by other lenders.
As we expand our fleet, we may not be able to recruit suitable employees and crew for our vessels which may limit our growth and cause our financial performance to suffer
As we expand our fleet, we will need to recruit suitable crew, shoreside, administrative and management personnel. We may not be able to continue to hire suitable employees as we expand our fleet of vessels. If we are unable to recruit suitable employees and crews, we may not be able to provide our services to customers, our growth may be limited and our financial performance may suffer.
We are subject to certain risks with respect to our counterparties on contracts, and failure of such counterparties to meet their obligations could cause us to suffer losses or otherwise adversely affect our business
We have entered into various contracts, including charterparties with our customers, newbuilding contracts with shipyards and our credit facilities. Such agreements subject us to counterparty risks. Charterers are sensitive to the commodity markets and may be impacted by market forces affecting commodities. In addition, in depressed market conditions, there have been reports of charterers renegotiating their charters or defaulting on their obligations under charters. Our charterers may fail to pay charterhire or attempt to renegotiate charter rates. Should a charterer fail to honor its obligations under agreements with us, it may be difficult to secure substitute employment for such vessel, and any new charter arrangements we secure on the spot market or on charters may be at lower rates, depending on the then existing charter rate levels, compared to the rates currently being charged for our vessels. In addition, if the charterer of a vessel in our fleet that is used as collateral under our credit facility or any other loan agreement defaults on its charter obligations to us, such default may constitute an event of default under our credit facility or the relevant loan agreement, which may allow the bank to exercise remedies under our credit facility or the loan agreement. If our charterers fail to meet their obligations to us or attempt to renegotiate our charter agreements, we could sustain significant losses which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows, as well as our ability to pay dividends, if any, in the future, and compliance with covenants in our loan agreements. Further, if we had to find a replacement technical manager, we may need approval from our lenders to change the technical manager.
The ability of each of the counterparties to perform its obligations under a contract with us or contracts entered into on our behalf will depend on a number of factors that are beyond our control and may include, among other things, general economic conditions, the condition of the shipping sector, the overall financial condition of the counterparty, charter rates received for tanker vessels and the supply and demand for commodities. Should a counterparty fail to honor its obligations under any such contracts, we could sustain significant losses which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
Declines in charter rates and other market deterioration could cause us to incur impairment charges
The carrying values of our vessels are reviewed whenever events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount of the vessel may no longer be recoverable. We assess recoverability of the carrying value by estimating the future net cash flows expected to result from the vessel, including eventual disposal. If the future net undiscounted cash flows and the estimated fair market value of the vessel are less than the carrying value an impairment loss is recorded equal to the difference between the vessel's carrying value and fair value. Any impairment charges incurred as a result of declines in charter rates and other market deterioration could negatively affect our business, financial condition, operating results or the trading price of our Ordinary Shares.
Fuel or bunker prices, may adversely affect our profits
For vessels on voyage charters, fuel oil, or bunkers, is a significant, if not the largest, expense. Changes in the price of fuel may adversely affect our profitability to the extent we have vessels on voyage charters. The price and supply of fuel is unpredictable and fluctuates based on events outside our control, including geopolitical developments, supply and demand for oil and gas, actions by OPEC and other oil and gas producers, war and unrest in oil producing countries and regions, regional production patterns and environmental concerns. Further, fuel may become much more expensive in the future, which may reduce the profitability and competitiveness of our business versus other forms of transportation, such as truck or rail.
Operational risks and damage to our vessels could adversely impact our performance
If our vessels suffer damage due to inherent operational risks, we may experience unexpected drydocking costs and delays or total loss of our vessels, which may adversely affect our revenues and business and financial condition.
Our vessels and their cargoes will be at risk of being damaged or lost because of events such as marine disasters, bad weather and other acts of God, business interruptions caused by mechanical failures, grounding, fire, explosions and collisions, human error, war, terrorism, piracy and other circumstances or events. Changing economic, regulatory and political conditions in some countries, including political and military conflicts, have from time to time resulted in attacks on vessels, mining of waterways, piracy, terrorism, labor strikes and boycotts. These hazards may result in death or injury to persons, loss of revenues or property, the payment of ransoms, environmental damage, higher insurance rates, damage to our customer relationships and market disruptions, delay or rerouting.
If our vessels suffer damage, they may need to be repaired at a drydocking facility. The costs of drydock repairs are unpredictable and may be substantial. We may have to pay drydocking costs that our insurance does not cover at all or in full. The loss of revenues while these vessels are being repaired and repositioned, as well as the actual cost of these repairs, may adversely affect our business and financial condition. In addition, space at drydocking facilities is sometimes limited and not all drydocking facilities are conveniently located. We may be unable to find space at a suitable drydocking facility or our vessels may be forced to travel to a drydocking facility that is not conveniently located relative to our vessels' positions. The loss of earnings while these vessels are forced to wait for space or to travel to more distant drydocking facilities may adversely affect our business and financial condition. Further, the total loss of any of our vessels could harm our reputation as a safe and reliable vessel owner and operator. If we are unable to adequately maintain or safeguard our vessels, we may be unable to prevent any such damage, costs or loss which could negatively impact our business, financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
Increased inspection procedures, tighter import and export controls and new security regulations could increase costs and cause disruption of our business
International shipping is subject to security and customs inspection and related procedures in countries of origin, destination and trans-shipment points. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there have been a variety of initiatives intended to enhance vessel security. On November 25, 2002, the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, or MTSA, came into effect. To implement certain portions of the MTSA, in July 2003, the U.S. Coast Guard issued regulations requiring the implementation of certain security requirements aboard vessels operating in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. These security procedures can result in delays in the loading, offloading or trans-shipment and the levying of customs duties, fines or other penalties against exporters or importers and, in some cases, carriers. Future changes to the existing security procedures may be implemented that could affect the tanker sector. These changes have the potential to impose additional financial and legal obligations on carriers and, in certain cases, to render the shipment of certain types of goods uneconomical or impractical. These additional costs could reduce the volume of goods shipped, resulting in a decreased demand for vessels and have a negative effect on our business, revenues and customer relations.
Risks Related to Our Company
Incurrence of expenses or liabilities may reduce or eliminate distributions
Our policy is to make distributions to shareholders based on earnings and cash flow, and our dividends have fluctuated based on such factors. The amount and timing of dividends will depend on our earnings, market prospects, capital expenditure program, investment opportunities and other factors. However, we could incur other expenses or contingent liabilities that would reduce or eliminate the cash available for distribution by us as dividends. In addition, the timing and amount of dividends, if any, is at the discretion of our Board of Directors. We cannot assure you that we will pay dividends.
Our financing obligations could affect the ability of our subsidiaries to incur additional indebtedness or our ability to engage in certain transactions
Our financing agreements impose operational and financing restrictions on us and/or our subsidiaries, which may significantly limit or prohibit, among other things, our subsidiaries' ability to, without the consent of our lenders, incur additional indebtedness, create liens, make certain investments or, if a default has been declared, to pay dividends, our ability to sell capital shares of subsidiaries and engage in mergers and acquisitions. In addition, our lenders may accelerate the maturity of indebtedness under our financing agreements and foreclose on the collateral securing the indebtedness upon the occurrence of certain events of default, including our failure to comply with any of the covenants contained in our financing agreements, not rectified within the permitted time. For instance, declining vessel values could lead to a breach of covenants under our financing agreements. If we are unable to prepay, pledge additional collateral or obtain waivers from our lenders, our lenders could accelerate our debt and foreclose on our vessels.
We may not be able to finance our future capital commitments
We cannot guarantee that we will be able to obtain additional financing at all or on terms acceptable to us. If adequate funds are not available, we may have to reduce expenditures for investments in new and existing projects, which could hinder our growth and prevent us from realizing potential revenues from prior investments which will have a negative impact on our cash flows and results of operations.
The aging of our fleet may result in increased operating costs in the future, which could adversely affect our earnings
In general, the cost of maintaining a vessel in good operating condition increases with the age of the vessel. Our current tanker fleet has an average age of approximately 11 years, and our current drybulk carrier fleet has an average age of approximately 20 years. As our fleet ages, we will incur increased costs. Older vessels are typically less fuel efficient and more costly to maintain than more recently constructed vessels due to improvements in engine technology. Cargo insurance rates also increase with the age of a vessel, making older vessels less desirable to charterers. Governmental regulations, including environmental regulations, safety or other equipment standards related to the age of vessels may require expenditures for alterations, or the addition of new equipment, to our vessels and may restrict the type of activities in which our vessels may engage. As our vessels age, market conditions might not justify those expenditures or enable us to operate our vessels profitably during the remainder of their useful lives.
If we do not set aside funds and are unable to borrow or raise funds for vessel replacement at the end of a vessel's useful life our revenue will decline, which would adversely affect our business, results of operations, financial condition and ability to pay dividends
If we do not set aside funds and are unable to borrow or raise funds for vessel replacement, we will be unable to replace the vessels in our fleet upon the expiration of their remaining useful lives. Our cash flows and income are dependent on the revenues earned by the chartering of our vessels. If we are unable to replace the vessels in our fleet upon the expiration of their useful lives, our business, results of operations, financial condition and ability to pay dividends would be adversely affected. Any funds set aside for vessel replacement will not be available for dividends.
We may be unable to attract and retain key management personnel in the tanker industry, which may negatively impact the effectiveness of our management and our results of operation
Our success depends to a significant extent upon the abilities and efforts of our senior executives, and particularly John Fredriksen, our Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, for the management of our activities and strategic guidance. While we believe that we have an experienced management team, the loss or unavailability of one or more of our senior executives, and particularly Mr. Fredriksen, for any extended period of time could have an adverse effect on our business and results of operations.
If labor interruptions are not resolved in a timely manner, they could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and available cash
As of December 31, 2010, Frontline and its subsidiaries employed approximately 70 people in their respective offices in Bermuda, London, Oslo, Singapore and India. We contract with independent ship managers to manage and operate our vessels, including the crewing of those vessels. If not resolved in a timely and cost-effective manner, industrial action or other labor unrest could prevent or hinder our operations from being carried out as we expect and could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and available cash.
We may not have adequate insurance to compensate us if our vessels are damaged or lost
We procure insurance for our fleet against those risks that we believe the shipping industry commonly insures against. These insurances include hull and machinery insurance, protection and indemnity insurance, which include environmental damage and pollution insurance coverage, and war risk insurance. We can give no assurance that we will be adequately insured against all risks. We may not be able to obtain adequate insurance coverage for our fleet in the future. The insurers may not pay particular claims. Our insurance policies may contain deductibles for which we will be responsible and limitations and exclusions which, may increase our costs or lower our revenue.
Although we do not anticipate any difficulty in having our technical manager initially obtain insurance policies for us, we cannot assure you that we will be able to renew such policies on the same or commercially reasonable terms, or at all, in the future. For example, more stringent environmental regulations have in the past led to increased costs for, and in the future may result in the lack of availability of, protection and indemnity insurance against risks of environmental damage or pollution. Any uninsured or underinsured loss could harm our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends. In addition, our insurance may be voidable by the insurers as a result of certain of our actions, such as our vessels failing to maintain certification with applicable maritime self-regulatory organizations. Further, we cannot assure you that our insurance policies will cover all losses that we incur, or that disputes over insurance claims will not arise with our insurance carriers. Any claims covered by insurance would be subject to deductibles, and since it is possible that a large number of claims may be brought, the aggregate amount of these deductibles could be material. In addition, our insurance policies may be subject to limitations and exclusions, which may increase our costs or lower our revenues, thereby possibly having a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows, financial condition and ability to pay dividends.
We may be subject to calls because we obtain some of our insurance through protection and indemnity associations
We may be subject to increased premium payments, or calls, if the value of our claim records, the claim records of our fleet managers, and/or the claim records of other members of the protection and indemnity associations through which we receive insurance coverage for tort liability (including pollution-related liability) significantly exceed projected claims. In addition, our protection and indemnity associations may not have enough resources to cover claims made against them. Our payment of these calls could result in significant expense to us, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Because we are a foreign corporation, you may not have the same rights that a shareholder in a United States corporation may have
We are a Bermuda company. Our memorandum of association and by-laws and the Bermuda Companies Act 1981, as amended, govern our affairs. Investors may have more difficulty in protecting their interests in the face of actions by management, directors or controlling shareholders than would shareholders of a corporation incorporated in a United States jurisdiction. Under Bermuda law a director generally owes a fiduciary duty only to the company; not to the company's shareholders. Our shareholders may not have a direct course of action against our directors. In addition, Bermuda law does not provide a mechanism for our shareholders to bring a class action lawsuit under Bermuda law. Further, our bye-laws provide for the indemnification of our directors or officers against any liability arising out of any act or omission except for an act or omission constituting fraud, dishonesty or illegality.
United States tax authorities could treat the Company as a "passive foreign investment company," which could have adverse United States federal income tax consequences to United States shareholders
A foreign corporation will be treated as a "passive foreign investment company," or PFIC, for United States federal income tax purposes if either (1) at least 75% of its gross income for any taxable year consists of certain types of "passive income" or (2) at least 50% of the average value of the corporation's assets produce or are held for the production of those types of "passive income." For purposes of these tests, "passive income" includes dividends, interest, and gains from the sale or exchange of investment property and rents and royalties other than rents and royalties which are received from unrelated parties in connection with the active conduct of a trade or business. For purposes of these tests, income derived from the performance of services does not constitute "passive income." United States shareholders of a PFIC are subject to a disadvantageous United States federal income tax regime with respect to the distributions they receive from the PFIC and the gain, if any, they derive from the sale or other disposition of their shares in the PFIC.
Based on our current and proposed method of operation, we do not believe that we are, have been or will be a PFIC with respect to any taxable year. In this regard, we intend to treat the gross income we derive or are deemed to derive from our time chartering and voyage chartering activities as services income, rather than rental income. Accordingly, we believe that our income from these activities does not constitute "passive income," and the assets that we own and operate in connection with the production of that income do not constitute assets that produce, or are held for the production of, "passive income."
Although there is no direct legal authority under the PFIC rules addressing our method of operation there is substantial legal authority supporting our position consisting of case law and United States Internal Revenue Service, or the IRS, pronouncements concerning the characterization of income derived from time charters and voyage charters as services income for other tax purposes. However, it should be noted that there is also authority which characterizes time charter income as rental income rather than services income for other tax purposes. Accordingly, no assurance can be given that the IRS or a court of law will accept our position, and there is a risk that the IRS or a court of law could determine that we are a PFIC. Moreover, no assurance can be given that we would not constitute a PFIC for any future taxable year if there were to be changes in the nature and extent of our operations.
If the IRS were to find that we are or have been a PFIC for any taxable year, our United States shareholders will face adverse United States federal income tax consequences. Under the PFIC rules, unless those shareholders make an election available under the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or the Code (which election could itself have adverse consequences for such shareholders, as discussed below under "Taxation"), such shareholders would be liable to pay United States federal income tax at the then prevailing income tax rates on ordinary income plus interest upon excess distributions and upon any gain from the disposition of our Ordinary Shares, as if the excess distribution or gain had been recognized ratably over the shareholder's holding period of our Ordinary Shares. See "Taxation" for a more comprehensive discussion of the United States federal income tax consequences to United States shareholders if we are treated as a PFIC.
We may have to pay tax on United States source income, which would reduce our earnings
Under the Code, 50% of the gross shipping income of a vessel owning or chartering corporation, such as ourselves and our subsidiaries, that is attributable to transportation that begins or ends, but that does not both begin and end, in the United States, may be subject to a 4% United States federal income tax without allowance for deduction, unless that corporation qualifies for exemption from tax under Section 883 of the Code and the applicable Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder.
We expect that we and each of our subsidiaries will qualify for this statutory tax exemption and we will take this position for United States federal income tax return reporting purposes. However, there are factual circumstances beyond our control that could cause us to lose the benefit of this tax exemption and thereby become subject to United States federal income tax on our United States source shipping income. For example, we would no longer qualify for exemption under Section 883 of the Code for a particular taxable year if shareholders with a five percent or greater interest in the our Ordinary Shares owned, in the aggregate, 50% or more of our outstanding Ordinary Shares for more than half the days during the taxable year. Due to the factual nature of the issues involved, there can be no assurances on our tax-exempt status or that of any of our subsidiaries.
If we or our subsidiaries are not entitled to exemption under Section 883 of the Code for any taxable year, we, or our subsidiaries, could be subject during those years to an effective 2% United States federal income tax on gross shipping income derived during such a year that is attributable to the transport of cargoes to or from the United States. The imposition of this tax would have a negative effect on our business and would result in decreased earnings available for distribution to our shareholders.
Our Liberian subsidiaries may not be exempt from Liberian taxation, which would materially reduce our Liberian subsidiaries', and consequently our, net income and cash flow by the amount of the applicable tax
The Republic of Liberia enacted an income tax law generally effective as of January 1, 2001, or the New Act, which repealed, in its entirety, the prior income tax law in effect since 1977, pursuant to which our Liberian subsidiaries, as non-resident domestic corporations, were wholly exempt from Liberian tax.
In 2004, the Liberian Ministry of Finance issued regulations, or the New Regulations, pursuant to which a non-resident domestic corporation engaged in international shipping, such as our Liberian subsidiaries, will not be subject to tax under the New Act retroactive to January 1, 2001. In addition, the Liberian Ministry of Justice issued an opinion that the New Regulations were a valid exercise of the regulatory authority of the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, assuming that the New Regulations are valid, our Liberian subsidiaries will be wholly exempt from tax as under prior law. In 2009, the Liberian Ministry of Finance adopted an Economic Stimulus Act to clarify the tax treatment of non-resident Liberian corporations. Although such Act was signed into law by the President of Liberia it was never formally published, which is a requirement to make it effective. We are still waiting advice from Liberia regarding publication of the 2009 Economic Stimulus Act.
If our Liberian subsidiaries were subject to Liberian income tax under the New Act, our Liberian subsidiaries would be subject to tax at a rate of 35% on their worldwide income. As a result, their, and subsequently our, net income and cash flow would be materially reduced by the amount of the applicable tax. In addition, we, as a shareholder of the Liberian subsidiaries, would be subject to Liberian withholding tax on dividends paid by the Liberian subsidiaries at rates ranging from 15% to 20%.
Because our offices and most of our assets are outside the United States, you may not be able to bring suit against us, or enforce a judgment obtained against us in the United States
Our executive offices, administrative activities and assets are located outside the United States. As a result, it may be more difficult for investors to effect service of process within the United States upon us, or to enforce both in the United States and outside the United States judgments against us in any action, including actions predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the federal securities laws of the United States.
Investor confidence and the market price of our ordinary shares may be adversely impacted if we are unable to comply with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
We are subject to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires us to include in our Annual Report on Form 20-F our management's report on, and assessment of the effectiveness of, our internal controls over financial reporting. In addition, our independent registered public accounting firm is required to attest to and report on management's assessment of the effectiveness of our internal controls over financial reporting. If we fail to maintain the adequacy of our internal controls over financial reporting, we will not be in compliance with all of the requirements imposed by Section 404. Any failure to comply with Section 404 could result in an adverse reaction in the financial marketplace due to a loss of investor confidence in the reliability of our financial statements, which ultimately could harm our business and could negatively impact the market price of our common stock.
ITEM 4.
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INFORMATION ON THE COMPANY
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A. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPANY
The Company
We are Frontline Ltd., a Bermuda-based shipping company incorporated in Bermuda as a Bermuda exempted company under the Bermuda Companies Law of 1981 on June 12, 1992 (Company No. EC-17460). Our registered and principal executive offices are located at Par-la-Ville Place, 14 Par-la-Ville Road, Hamilton, HM 08, Bermuda, and our telephone number is +(1) 441 295 6935.
We are engaged primarily in the ownership and operation of oil tankers and oil/bulk/ore, or OBO, carriers, which are currently configured to carry dry cargo. We operate oil tankers of two sizes: VLCCs, which are between 200,000 and 320,000 dwt, and Suezmaxes, which are vessels between 120,000 and 170,000 dwt. We operate through subsidiaries and partnerships located in the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, India, the Isle of Man, Liberia, Norway, the United Kingdom and Singapore. We are also involved in the charter, purchase and sale of vessels. Since 1996, we have emerged as a leading tanker company within the VLCC and Suezmax size sectors of the market.
We have our origin in Frontline AB, which was founded in 1985, and which was listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1997. In May 1997, Frontline AB was redomiciled from Sweden to Bermuda and its shares were listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The change of domicile was executed through a share-for-share exchange offer from the then-newly formed Bermuda company, Frontline Ltd, or Old Frontline. In September 1997, Old Frontline initiated an amalgamation with London & Overseas Freighters Limited, or LOF, also a Bermuda company. This process was completed in May 1998. As a result of this transaction, Frontline became listed on the London Stock Exchange and on the NASDAQ National Market (in the form of American Depositary Shares, or ADSs, represented by American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs) in addition to its listing on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
The ADR program was terminated on October 5, 2001 and the ADSs were de-listed from the NASDAQ National Market on August 3, 2001. The Company's Ordinary Shares began trading on the New York Stock Exchange on August 6, 2001.
Vessel Acquisitions, Disposals and Other Significant Transactions
We entered into the following acquisitions and disposals in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 to date:
Newbuilding and Option Contracts
As of December 31, 2007, we had contracts for the construction of four VLCC newbuildings and eight Suezmax newbuildings. In April 2008, we entered into a contract with Jinhaiwan for the delivery of four VLCC newbuildings. In April 2008, we also secured fixed price options, which were exercised in May 2008, for two similar VLCC newbuildings. As of December 31, 2008, we had contracts for the construction of ten VLCC newbuildings and eight Suezmax newbuildings.
Two of the VLCCs, Front Kathrine and Front Queen, were delivered to us on January 8, 2009 and May 18, 2009, respectively. In the second quarter of 2009, we reached agreements with two shipyards to cancel two VLCC and four Suezmax newbuilding contracts and agreed that the instalments already paid on the cancelled newbuildings be applied to, and set off against, future payments in the remaining newbuildings. In the third quarter of 2009, we reached agreement with Jinhaiwan whereby the financial exposure of $252 million on two VLCC newbuildings could be limited to the $54 million already paid. At December 31, 2009, we had newbuilding contracts for four Suezmaxes and six VLCCs.
During 2010, six newbuildings were completed. Four Suezmax vessels were delivered: the Northia on January 5, the Naticina on March 9, the Front Odin on May 5 and the Front Njord on August 12. Two VLCCs were delivered: the Front Cecilie on June 10 and the Front Signe on August 9. In June 2010, the Company entered into a contract with Rongsheng for the construction of two 156,900 dwt Suezmax newbuildings. The vessels are expected to be delivered in the first and second quarters of 2013. In September 2010, the Company announced that it had agreed with Jinhaiwan to re-structure the Company's VLCC newbuilding program at the yard. The Company agreed to take delivery of the two optional VLCCs at the yard and ordered one additional VLCC newbuilding, resulting in a commitment to take delivery of five 320,000 dwt VLCC newbuildings, with a total contract price of $525 million. As of December 31, 2010, the Company's newbuilding program comprised two Suezmax tankers and five VLCCs, which constitute a contractual cost of $650 million. As of December 31, 2010, the Company has paid $198.6 million and was committed to make further installments of $451.4 million.
Acquisitions and Disposals
In January 2008, Ship Finance sold the single hull vessel Front Maple to a third party and terminated our charter party for the vessel. We received a termination payment of $16.7 million.
In March 2008, we agreed with Ship Finance to terminate the long-term charter party between the companies for the single hull VLCC Front Sabang. Ship Finance simultaneously sold the vessel. We received a compensation payment of approximately $25 million for the early termination of the charter party, which was recognized in the second quarter of 2008 at the time of delivery to the new owners.
In June 2008, we acquired en bloc five secondhand double hull Suezmax tankers built between 1992 and 1996 from Top Ships Inc. for an aggregate purchase price of $240 million. We took delivery of these vessels between June 2008 and September 2008 and assumed existing time charters on three of the vessels. We allocated $247.3 million and a negative value of $7.3 million to the vessels and time charters, respectively.
In July 2009, we agreed with Ship Finance to terminate the long term charterparty for the single hull VLCC Front Duchess and received a compensation payment of approximately $2.4 million in October 2009.
In February 2010, we purchased the VLCC Front Vista from Ship Finance for $58.5 million. The Front Vista had been chartered in by the Company. Due to the termination of the charter, a compensation fee of $0.4 million was paid to Ship Finance. In March 2010, the Company sold the Front Vista. The sale price of $60.0 million will be settled in the payment of installments over a 10-year period.
In March 2010, we agreed with Ship Finance to terminate the long term charter party for the single hull VLCC Golden River. The termination of the charter took place in April 2010 and Ship Finance made a compensation payment to us of approximately $2.9 million for the early termination of the charter party.
In March 2010, we agreed to sell the single hull Suezmax Front Voyager and delivery to the buyer took place in April 2010.
In April 2010, we agreed to acquire two 2009-built 321,300 dwt double hull VLCC tankers; Callisto Glory and Andromeda Glory from an unrelated third party. The first vessel; renamed Front Eminence, was delivered on May 18, 2010 and the second vessel; renamed Front Endurance, was delivered on June 28, 2010.
In January 2011, we sold the VLCC Front Shanghai for net sale proceeds of $91.2 million. In connection with the sale, we agreed to charter back the vessel from the new owner for approximately two years at a rate of $35,000 per day. Delivery to the new owners took place on January 26, 2011.
In February 2011, we agreed with Ship Finance to terminate the long term charter parties between the companies for the two single hull VLCCs Ticen Sun and Front Ace and Ship Finance simultaneously sold the vessels. The termination of the charter parties took place in February 2011 and March 2011, respectively, and Ship Finance made a compensation payment to the Company of approximately $5.8 million for the early termination of the charter parties.
In March 2011, we exercised our option to acquire the 2002-built VLCC Front Eagle and sold the vessel to an unrelated third party for $67.0 million. In connection with the sale, we agreed to charter back the vessel from the new owner. The duration of the time charter is approximately two years at a rate of $32,500 per day. Delivery to the new owners is expected to take place in the second quarter of 2011.
In April 2011, we agreed with Ship Finance to terminate the long term charter party between the companies for the OBO vessel Front Leader and Ship Finance simultaneously sold the vessel. The termination of the charter party is expected to take place in the second quarter of 2011 and we expect to make a compensation payment to Ship Finance of approximately $7.7 million for the early termination of the charter party.
Charters and Redeliveries
In September 2008, we chartered out the Suezmax OBO carriers Front Guider and Front Viewer for a period of five years with commencement of charter early December 2008 and mid April 2009, respectively.
In November 2008, we chartered out the VLCC Front Energy for a three year period with delivery mid-November 2008 and the VLCC Front Champion for a period of one year with commencement of charter end November 2008.
In early December 2008, we redelivered Cosglory Lake after a total length of the charter party of approximately 3.5 years.
In December 2008, we entered into an agreement with Teekay Corporation to commercially combine their Suezmax tankers within the Gemini Pool, the world's largest Suezmax tanker pool. Our vessels entered the pool between January 8 and February 12, 2009.
In December 2008, we chartered out the Suezmax tanker Front Brabant for a three-year time charter with commencement in January 2009.
In January 2009, we entered into an agreement with Shell to charter out the two double hull Suezmax tankers Genmar Phoenix and Genmar Harriet G. on time charter for the remainder of their existing charters in.
In April 2009, we entered into an agreement with the charterer of Front Lady and Front Highness to amend the time charter agreements to bareboat agreements and extend the contracts for one additional year from the single hull phase-out date in 2010 to around April 2011 and August 2011, respectively. The charterers also assumed the drydocking for Front Lady. The vessels are operated as floating storage units and have ceased to trade as regular tankers. The vessels have been renamed "Ticen Ocean" and "Ticen Sun".
In early November and December 2009, we redelivered four of the five Suezmax tankers chartered in from Eiger. We redelivered the final vessel in February 2010.
In November 2009, we did not exercise the purchase options for Front Chief, Front Commander and Front Crown. We agreed instead to charter in the three vessels on one-year time charters at $29,000 per day.
In November 2009, we entered into an agreement to time charter out the OBO carrier Front Striver for a period of at least five months at a time charter rate of $40,000 per day gross.
In January 2010, we entered into an agreement to charter in the VLCC Desh Ujaala for a one year time charter at net $29,625 per day with one-year option period.
In January 2010, we signed a bareboat charter for the VLCC Edinburgh for a two year period with a two-year option period. The vessel is operated as a floating storage unit and ceased to trade as a regular tanker.
In March 2010 we agreed with Ship Finance to terminate the long-term charter party for the single hull VLCC Golden River. Ship Finance simultaneously sold the vessel to an unrelated third party. The termination of the charter took place in April 2010 and Ship Finance made a compensation payment to Frontline of approximately $2.9 million for the early termination of the charter party.
In June 2010, we received notices from the owners of the two chartered-in 2001-built Suezmax tankers, Front Melody and Front Symphony, and the two chartered-in 2000-built VLCCs, Front Tina and Front Commodore, that the owners exercised their option to extend the charter period for two years to the end of 2013 from the expiry of the mandatory lease period at the end of 2011. The owners have the option to further extend the charter periods until the end of 2015.
In June 2010, the single hull VLCC Front Duke was redelivered from her time charter agreement and subsequently entered into a bareboat charter agreement expiring at the end of 2012. The vessel is operated as a floating storage unit and has ceased to trade as a regular tanker.
With effect from July 1, 2010, we no longer chartered in the 15 Suezmax vessels we were chartering in from Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd. ("NATS") on floating rate time charters.
In September 2010, we entered into an agreement to time charter out two VLCCs; Front Eminence for a period of five years commencing November 2010 at a gross rate of $43,000 per day and Golden Victory for a period of three years commencing October 2010 at a gross rate of $40,000 per day. The latter has an option for the charterer to extend for an additional two years at a premium.
In November 2010, we extended the time-charter in agreements of Front Chief, Front Commander and Front Crown (all 1999-built double hull VLCCs); for one year from January 2011 at $26,500 per day per vessel.
In December 2010, the bareboat charter with Chevron Transport Corporation for the VLCC Antares Voyager terminated and the vessel was redelivered to the Company.
In January 2011, the bareboat charter with BP Shipping Limited for the VLCC Pioneer (previously British Pioneer) terminated and the vessel was redelivered to the Company.
In January 2011, the chartered-in VLCC Desh Ujaala was re-delivered to the owners and the British Pioneer was redelivered to the Company following the termination of the bareboat charter by BP.
Establishment and Spin-Off of Sealift Ltd
In January 2007, we established a separate entity named Sealift Ltd, or Sealift, to develop our heavy lift business. Sealift completed a private placement in the amount of $180.0 million and its shares were listed on the Norwegian over-the-counter (OTC) market in January 2007. We invested $60.0 million in the company and, following the initial private placement in January, we became a 33.3% shareholder. Sealift acquired four single-hull Suezmax vessels from us, which we were obligated to convert to heavy lift vessels for $100.0 million each. Sealift also acquired two Suezmax vessels from us for $38.0 million each and option contracts with a shipyard to convert these two additional Suezmax vessels into heavy lift vessels. The total consideration for all six vessels acquired by Sealift is $476.0 million, of which $396.0 million was received in cash and $80.0 million in an interest free seller's credit. $40.0 million of the interest free seller's credit was payable on the delivery of each of the final two converted vessels. Five of the vessels sold to Sealift were first acquired by Frontline from Ship Finance. We delivered the converted heavy lift vessels to Sealift in May and December 2007 and May and July 2008. The $80.0 million interest-free seller's credit was paid in July 2008 and we recorded a gain of $91.0 million in 2008 relating to the delivery of the converted heavylift vessels. We incurred net damages of $1.2 million with respect to the late delivery of the fourth and final converted heavylift vessel.
In May 2007, Sealift completed a reorganization with the Dockwise group of companies. As part of the transaction, Sealift completed a private placement of 39.8 million shares of which we purchased five million shares. Sealift also issued 94.1 million shares to the former Dockwise Ltd, or Dockwise, shareholders. Sealift was renamed Dockwise Ltd in July 2007. In October 2007, we sold our entire shareholding of 34,976,500 shares in Dockwise.
Establishment and spin-off of Independent Tankers Corporation Limited
In January 2008, we established Independent Tankers Corporation Limited, or ITCL, a Bermuda company and our wholly-owned subsidiary for the purpose of holding, by way of contribution, our interests in Independent Tankers Corporation, or ITC. ITC owns or leases six VLCC and four Suezmax tankers, which are financed through bonds in the U.S. market and financial lease arrangements. On February 20, 2008, our Board declared the distribution of a special dividend of 17.53% of the capital stock of ITCL to our shareholders. On February 28, 2008, we distributed to our shareholders one share of ITCL for every five shares of Frontline. Certain of our U.S. shareholders were excluded from the distribution and received a cash payment in lieu of shares equal to $0.34 per Frontline share. ITCL listed its shares on the Oslo OTC Market on March 7, 2008.
B. BUSINESS OVERVIEW
As of December 31, 2010, our tanker and OBO fleet consisted of 73 vessels. The fleet consists of 44 VLCCs, which are either owned or chartered in, 21 Suezmax tankers which are either owned or chartered in and eight Suezmax OBOs which are chartered in. We also had five VLCC newbuildings and two Suezmax newbuildings on order and three VLCCs under our commercial management.
We operate in two markets, the tanker and drybulk carrier markets, as an international provider of seaborne transportation of crude oil and drybulk cargoes. An analysis of revenues from these services is as follows:
(in thousands of $)
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2010
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2009
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2008
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Total operating revenues – tanker market
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1,023,733 |
|
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989,773 |
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1,955,427 |
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Total operating revenues – drybulk carrier market
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136,912 |
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124,983 |
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130,228 |
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Our vessels operate worldwide and therefore management does not evaluate performance by geographical region as this information is not meaningful.
As of December 31, 2010, the tanker fleet that we operate has a total tonnage of approximately 17.6 million dwt, including the 0.9 million dwt under commercial management, and the drybulk fleet that we operate has a total tonnage of approximately 1.4 million dwt. Our tanker vessels have an average age of approximately 11 years compared with an estimated industry average of approximately 9 years, and our OBO vessels have an average age of approximately 20 years compared with an estimated industry average of approximately 22 years. We believe that our vessels comply with the most stringent of generally applicable environmental regulations for tankers and OBO vessels.
We own various vessel owning and operating subsidiaries. Our operations take place substantially outside of the United States. Our subsidiaries, therefore, own and operate vessels that may be affected by changes in foreign governments and other economic and political conditions. We are engaged primarily in transporting crude oil and, in addition, raw materials like coal and iron ore and our vessels operate in the spot and time charter markets. Our VLCCs are specifically designed for the transportation of crude oil and, due to their size, are primarily used to transport crude oil from the Middle East Gulf to the Far East, Northern Europe, the Caribbean and the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, or LOOP. Our Suezmax tankers are similarly designed for worldwide trading, but the trade for these vessels is mainly in the Atlantic Basin, Middle East and Southeast Asia.
In December 2008, Teekay Corporation, or Teekay, and the Company announced an agreement to commercially combine their Suezmax vessels within the Gemini Pool, a global Suezmax tanker pool. Effective from January 1, 2009, we placed our Suezmax vessels within the Gemini Pool, bringing the total number of vessels in the pool to 36. Gemini Tankers LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Teekay, has established an office in Oslo, Norway to, among other things, manage the larger fleet and establish a chartering presence in Europe to supplement its existing operations in Stamford, Connecticut. We expect to improve the utilization on our fleet and to reduce the cost basis by entering a large pool. In addition to the Company and Teekay, NATS, König & Cie and Hyundai Merchant Marine also participate in the Gemini Pool.
Historically, the tanker industry has been highly cyclical, with attendant volatility in profitability and asset values resulting from changes in the supply of and demand for tanker capacity. Our OBO carriers are specifically designed to carry oil or dry cargo and may be used to transport either oil or dry cargo on any voyage. Currently, our eight Suezmax OBOs are configured to carry dry bulk cargo and are fixed on medium- to long-term charters.
The supply of tanker and OBO capacity is influenced by the number of new vessels built, the number of older vessels scrapped, converted, laid up and lost, the efficiency of the world tanker or OBO fleet and government and industry regulation of maritime transportation practices. The demand for tanker and OBO capacity is influenced by global and regional economic conditions, increases and decreases in industrial production and demand for crude oil and petroleum products, the proportion of world oil output supplied by Middle Eastern and other producers, political changes and armed conflicts (including wars in the Middle East) and changes in seaborne and other transportation patterns. The demand for OBO capacity is, in addition, influenced by increases and decreases in the production and demand for raw materials such as iron ore and coal. In particular, demand for our tankers and our services in transporting crude oil and petroleum products and dry cargoes has been dependent upon world and regional markets. Any decrease in shipments of crude oil or raw materials in world markets could have a material adverse effect on our earnings. Historically, these markets have been volatile as a result of, among other things, general economic conditions, prices, environmental concerns, weather and competition from alternative energy sources. Because many factors influencing the supply of and demand for tankers and OBO carriers are unpredictable, the nature, timing and degree of changes in industry conditions are also unpredictable.
We are committed to providing quality transportation services to all of our customers and to developing and maintaining long-term relationships with the major charterers of tankers. Increasing global environmental concerns have created a demand in the petroleum products/crude oil seaborne transportation industry for vessels that are able to conform to the stringent environmental standards currently being imposed throughout the world.
The tanker industry is highly cyclical, experiencing volatility in profitability, vessel values and freight rates. Freight rates are strongly influenced by the supply of tanker vessels and the demand for oil transportation. Refer to Item 5 "Operating and Financial Review and Prospects" for a discussion of the tanker market in 2010 and 2011.
Similar to structures commonly used by other shipping companies, our vessels are all owned by, or chartered to, separate subsidiaries or associated companies. Frontline Management AS, and Frontline Management (Bermuda) Limited which we refer to as Frontline Management, both wholly-owned subsidiaries, support us in the implementation of our decisions. Frontline Management is responsible for the commercial management of our shipowning subsidiaries, including chartering and insurance. Each of our vessels is registered under the Bahamas, French, Liberian, Panamanian, Cypriot, Singaporean, Norwegian, Isle of Man, Marshall Islands, Hong Kong or Maltese flag.
Frontline has a strategy of extensive outsourcing. Ship management, crewing and accounting services are provided by a number of independent and competing suppliers. Our vessels are managed by independent ship management companies. Pursuant to management agreements, each of the independent ship management companies provides operations, ship maintenance, crewing, technical support, shipyard supervision and related services to Frontline. A central part of our strategy is to benchmark operational performance and cost level amongst our ship managers. Independent ship managers provide crewing for our vessels. Currently, our vessels are crewed with Russian, Ukrainian, Croatian, Romanian, Indian and Filipino officers and crews, or combinations of these nationalities. Accounting services for each of our ship-owning subsidiaries are also provided by the ship managers.
Frontline decided in August 2009 to establish a ship management company in Singapore. The new company, Sea Team Management Pte. Ltd., is a complement to the external ship management companies currently offering services to Frontline and is not a change in the Company's outsourcing strategy. However, we would like to strengthen our position towards our service providers to enhance and secure delivery of high quality service at low cost in the future. Sea Team Management Pte Ltd. was certified and received its ISM Document of Compliance by Det Norske Veritas on February 3, 2010 and is as such an approved ship management company. In addition a crewing company was formally opened in Chennai, India, on January 17, 2010.
Our principal executive offices are located at Par-la-Ville Place, 14 Par-la-Ville Road in Hamilton, Bermuda.
Strategy
Our strategy is to maintain and expand our position as a world-leading operator and charterer of modern, high quality oil tankers. Our principal focus is the transportation of crude oil and its related refined dirty petroleum cargoes for major oil companies and major oil trading companies. We seek to optimize our income and adjust our exposure through actively pursuing charter opportunities whether through time charters, bareboat charters, sale and leasebacks, straight sales and purchases of vessels, newbuilding contracts and acquisitions.
We presently operate VLCC and Suezmax vessels in the tanker market and OBO vessels in the dry cargo market. Our strategy is to have at least 30% fixed charter income coverage for our fleet, predominantly through time charters, and trade the balance of the fleet on the spot market. We focus on minimizing time spent on ballast by "cross trading" our vessels, typically with voyages loading in the Persian Gulf discharging in Northern Europe, followed by a trans-Atlantic voyage to the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and, finally, a voyage from either the Caribbean or West Africa to the Far East/Indian Ocean. We believe that operating a certain number of vessels in the spot market, enables us to capitalize on a potential stronger spot market as well as to serve our main customers on a regular non term basis. We believe that the size of our fleet is important in negotiating terms with our major clients and charterers. We also believe that our large, high-quality VLCC and Suezmax fleet enhances our ability to obtain competitive terms from suppliers and ship repairers and builders and to produce cost savings in chartering and operations.
Our business strategy is primarily based upon the following principles:
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emphasizing operational safety and quality maintenance for all of our vessels;
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complying with all current and proposed environmental regulations;
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outsourcing technical operations and crewing;
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continuing to achieve competitive operational costs;
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operating a modern and homogeneous fleet of tankers;
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achieving high utilization of our vessels;
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achieving competitive financing arrangements;
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achieving a satisfactory mix of term charters, contracts of affreightment and spot voyages; and
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developing and maintaining relationships with major oil companies and industrial charterers.
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We have newbuilding contracts for five VLCCs and two Suezmax vessels as of April 4, 2011.
We continue to evaluate opportunities in the time charter market. On the basis of the strength of the drybulk market when the vessels became available, all of our eight OBO carriers have been fixed on medium- to long-term charters at an average daily rate of approximately $47,000 and $48,000 in 2010 and 2011, respectively. As of December 31, 2010, approximately 22% of our operating days for our total fleet for 2011 were on fixed time charter and bareboat charter, excluding the vessels in ITCL.
Although there has been a trend towards consolidation over the past 15 years, the tanker market remains highly fragmented. We estimate, based on available industry data that we currently own or operate approximately 8% of the world VLCC fleet and 5% of the world Suezmax tanker fleet. We intend to use our operational cash flow together with our available financing to continue the consolidation of the tanker market. We always look for attractive investments and acquisitions and will finance such investments through a combination of debt and equity. Our role in the consolidation of the tanker market may include the acquisition of new vessels and second-hand vessels and we may also engage in business acquisitions and strategic transactions such as marketing joint ventures. In the ordinary course of our business, we engage in the evaluation of potential candidates for acquisitions and strategic transactions.
Our goal is to generate competitive returns for our shareholders with quarterly dividend payments. Our dividend payments are based on present earnings, market prospects, current capital expenditure programs as well as investment opportunities.
Seasonality
Historically, oil trade and, therefore, charter rates increased in the winter months and eased in the summer months as demand for oil in the Northern Hemisphere rose in colder weather and fell in warmer weather. The tanker industry, in general, has become less dependent on the seasonal transport of heating oil than a decade ago as new uses for oil and oil products have developed, spreading consumption more evenly over the year. Most apparent is a higher seasonal demand during the summer months due to energy requirements for air conditioning and motor vehicles.
The dry bulk trade also has a history of tracking seasonal demand fluctuations, but like the oil trade, appears to have become less dependent on such fluctuations as a result of the increased transportation of certain dry bulk commodities. Grain has traditionally had the greatest impact on the dry bulk market, particularly during the peak demand seasons, which occur during the second quarter in the Southern Hemisphere and at the end of the third quarter and throughout the fourth quarter in the Northern Hemisphere. The growth of iron ore and coal transportation over the last decade, however, has diminished the relative importance of grain to the dry bulk transportation industry. With the quarterly pricing of iron ore affecting its demand and factors such as weather and port congestion impacting the dry bulk industry as a whole, the volatility of dry bulk earnings in recent years appears to be the result of factors other than seasonality.
Customers
During the year ended December 31, 2010, we reported total revenue from one customer of $244 million, which represented approximately 21% of consolidated operating revenues (2009: one customer, which represented approximately 22% and 2008: one customer, which represented approximately 20%). This was the same customer in each year. No other customers represent more than 10% of consolidated operating revenues for the periods presented.
Competition
The market for international seaborne crude oil transportation services is highly fragmented and competitive. Seaborne crude oil transportation services generally are provided by two main types of operators: major oil company captive fleets (both private and state-owned) and independent ship-owner fleets. In addition, several owners and operators pool their vessels together on an ongoing basis, and such pools are available to customers to the same extent as independently owned-and-operated fleets. Many major oil companies and other oil trading companies, the primary charterers of the vessels owned or controlled by us, also operate their own vessels and use such vessels not only to transport their own crude oil but also to transport crude oil for third-party charterers in direct competition with independent owners and operators in the tanker charter market. Competition for charters is intense and is based upon price, location, size, age, condition and acceptability of the vessel and its manager. Competition is also affected by the availability of other size vessels to compete in the trades in which the Company engages. Charters are, to a large extent, brokered through international independent brokerage houses that specialize in finding the optimal ship for any particular cargo based on the aforementioned criteria. Brokers may be appointed by the cargo shipper or the ship owner.
Environmental and Other Regulations
Government regulations and laws significantly affect the ownership and operation of our vessels. We are subject to international conventions, national, state and local laws and regulations in force in the countries in which our vessels may operate or are registered and compliance with such laws, regulations and other requirements may entail significant expense.
Our vessels are subject to both scheduled and unscheduled inspections by a variety of government, quasi-governmental and private organizations including local port authorities, national authorities, harbor masters or equivalent, classification societies, flag state administrations (countries of registry) and charterers. Our failure to maintain permits, licenses, certificates or other approvals required by some of these entities could require us to incur substantial costs or temporarily suspend operation of one or more of our vessels.
We believe that the heightened levels of environmental and quality concerns among insurance underwriters, regulators and charterers have led to greater inspection and safety requirements on all vessels and may accelerate the scrapping of older vessels throughout the industry. Increasing environmental concerns have created a demand for vessels that conform to stricter environmental standards. We believe that the operation of our vessels is in substantial compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations and that our vessels have all material permits, licenses, certificates or other authorizations necessary for the conduct of our operations; however, because such laws and regulations are frequently changed and may impose increasingly stricter requirements, we cannot predict the ultimate cost of complying with these requirements, or the impact of these requirements on the resale value or useful lives of our vessels. In addition, a future serious marine incident that results in significant oil pollution or otherwise causes significant adverse environmental impact, such as the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, could result in additional legislation or regulation that could negatively affect our profitability.
International Maritime Organization
The International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency for maritime safety and the prevention of pollution by ships or the IMO, has adopted several international conventions that regulate the international shipping industry, including the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, or the MARPOL Convention. The MARPOL Convention establishes environmental standards relating to oil leakage or spilling, garbage management, sewage, air emissions, handling and disposal of noxious liquids and the handling of harmful substances in packaged forms.
The operation of our vessels is also affected by the requirements contained in the International Safety Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention, or ISM Code, promulgated by the IMO under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, or SOLAS. The ISM Code requires the party with operational control of a vessel to develop an extensive safety management system that includes, among other things, the adoption of a safety and environmental protection policy setting forth instructions and procedures for operating its vessels safely and describing procedures for responding to emergencies. We intend to rely upon the safety management system that our appointed ship managers have developed.
In December 2003, the Marine Environmental Protection Committee of the IMO, or MEPC, adopted an amendment to the MARPOL Convention, which became effective in April 2005. The amendment revised an existing regulation 13G accelerating the phase-out of single hull oil tankers and adopted a new regulation 13H on the prevention of oil pollution from oil tankers when carrying heavy grade oil. Under the revised regulation, single hull oil tankers were required to be phased out no later than April 5, 2005 or the anniversary of the date of delivery of the ship on the date or in the year specified in the following table:
Category of Oil Tankers
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Date or Year for Phase Out
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Category 1 oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30,000 dwt and above carrying other oils, which do not comply with the requirements for protectively located segregated ballast tanks
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April 5, 2005 for ships delivered on April 5, 1982 or earlier; or
2005 for ships delivered after April 5, 1982
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Category 2 - oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30,000 dwt and above carrying other oils, which do comply with the protectively located segregated ballast tank requirements
and
Category 3 - oil tankers of 5,000 dwt and above but less than the tonnage specified for Category 1 and 2 tankers.
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April 5, 2005 for ships delivered on April 5, 1977 or earlier
2005 for ships delivered after April 5, 1977 but before
January 1, 1978
2006 for ships delivered in 1978 and 1979
2007 for ships delivered in 1980 and 1981
2008 for ships delivered in 1982
2009 for ships delivered in 1983
2010 for ships delivered in 1984 or later
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Under the revised regulations, a flag state may permit continued operation of certain Category 2 or 3 tankers beyond their phase-out date in accordance with the above schedule. Under regulation 13G, the flag state may allow for some newer single hull oil tankers registered in its country that conform to certain technical specifications to continue operating until the earlier of the anniversary of the date of delivery of the vessel in 2015 or the 25th anniversary of their delivery. Under regulations 13G and 13H, as described below, certain Category 2 and 3 tankers fitted only with double bottoms or double sides may be allowed by the flag state to continue operations until their 25th anniversary of delivery. Any port state, however, may deny entry of those single hull oil tankers that are allowed to operate under any of the flag state exemptions.
The following table summarizes the impact of such regulations on the Company's single hull (SH) and double sided (DS) tankers:
Vessel Name
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Vessel type
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Vessel
Category
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Year
Built
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IMO
phase out
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Flag state
Exemption
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Titan Aries (ex-Edinburgh)
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VLCC
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DS
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1993
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2018
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n/a
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Front Ace (1)
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VLCC
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SH
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1993
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2010
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2015
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Titan Orion (ex-Front Duke)
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VLCC
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SH
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1992
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2010
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2015
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Ticen Sun
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VLCC
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SH
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1991
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2010
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2015
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Ticen Ocean
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VLCC
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SH
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1991
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2010
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2015
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(1) Agreement reached in February 2011 regarding termination of the lease. Termination occurred in March 2011.
In December 2003, the MEPC adopted a new regulation 13H on the prevention of oil pollution from oil tankers when carrying heavy grade oil, or HGO, which includes most of the grades of marine fuel. The new regulation bans the carriage of HGO in single hull oil tankers of 5,000 dwt and above after April 5, 2005, and in single hull oil tankers of 600 dwt and above but less than 5,000 dwt, no later than the anniversary of their delivery in 2008.
Under regulation 13H, HGO means any of the following:
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crude oils having a density at 15єC higher than 900 kg/m3;
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fuel oils having either a density at 15єC higher than 900 kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity at 50ºC higher than 180 mm2/s; or
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bitumen, tar and their emulsions.
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Under the regulation 13H, the flag state may allow continued operation of oil tankers of 5,000 dwt and above, carrying crude oil with a density at 15єC higher than 900 kg/m3 but lower than 945 kg/m3, that conform to certain technical specifications and, in the opinion of the such flag state, the ship is fit to continue such operation, having regard to the size, age, operational area and structural conditions of the ship and provided that the continued operation shall not go beyond the date on which the ship reaches 25 years after the date of its delivery. The flag state may also allow continued operation of a single hull oil tanker of 600 dwt and above but less than 5,000 dwt, carrying HGO as cargo, if, in the opinion of the such flag state, the ship is fit to continue such operation, having regard to the size, age, operational area and structural conditions of the ship, provided that the operation shall not go beyond the date on which the ship reaches 25 years after the date of its delivery.
The flag state may also exempt an oil tanker of 600 dwt and above carrying HGO as cargo if the ship is either engaged in voyages exclusively within an area under its jurisdiction, or is engaged in voyages exclusively within an area under the jurisdiction of another party, provided the party within whose jurisdiction the ship will be operating agrees. The same applies to vessels operating as floating storage units of HGO.
Any port state, however, can deny entry of single hull tankers carrying HGO which have been allowed to continue operation under the exemptions mentioned above, into the ports or offshore terminals under its jurisdiction, or deny ship-to-ship transfer of HGO in areas under its jurisdiction except when this is necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea.
Noncompliance with the ISM Code or with other IMO regulations may subject a shipowner or bareboat charterer to increased liability, may lead to decreases in available insurance coverage for affected vessels and may result in the denial of access to, or detention in, some ports including United States and European Union Ports.
United States
The U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
The U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, or OPA, is an extensive regulatory and liability regime for environmental protection and cleanup of oil spills. OPA affects all owners and operators whose vessels trade with the United States or its territories or possessions, or whose vessels operate in the waters of the United States, which include the U.S. territorial sea and the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone around the United States. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, or CERCLA, imposes liability for cleanup and natural resource damage from the release of hazardous substances (other than oil) whether on land or at sea. Both OPA and CERCLA impact our operations.
Under OPA, vessel owners, operators and bareboat charterers are responsible parties who are jointly, severally and strictly liable (unless the spill results solely from the act or omission of a third party, an act of God or an act of war) for all containment and clean-up costs and other damages arising from oil spills from their vessels. OPA limits the liability of responsible parties with respect to tankers over 3,000 gross tons to the greater of $3,200 per gross tons or $23.496 million per single hull tanker, and $2,000 per gross ton or $17.088 million per double hull tanker, respectively, and permits individual states to impose their own liability regimes with regard to oil pollution incidents occurring within their boundaries. Some states have enacted legislation providing for unlimited liability for discharge of pollutants within their waters, however, in some cases, states which have enacted this type of legislation have not yet issued implementing regulations defining tanker owners' responsibilities under these laws. CERCLA, which applies to owners and operators of vessels, contains a similar liability regime and provides for cleanup, removal and natural resource damages. Liability under CERCLA is limited to the greater of $300 per gross ton or $5.0 million for vessels carrying a hazardous substance as cargo and the greater of $300 per gross ton or $0.5 million for any other vessel.
These limits of liability do not apply, however, where the incident is caused by violation of applicable U.S. federal safety, construction or operating regulations, or by the responsible party's gross negligence or willful misconduct. These limits also do not apply if the responsible party fails or refuses to report the incident or to cooperate and assist in connection with the substance removal activities. OPA and CERCLA each preserve the right to recover damages under existing law, including maritime tort law. We believe that we are in substantial compliance with OPA, CERCLA and all applicable state regulations in the ports where our vessels call.
OPA also requires owners and operators of vessels to establish and maintain with the U.S. Coast Guard evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the limit of their potential strict liability under the act. Under the regulations, evidence of financial responsibility may be demonstrated by insurance, surety bond, self-insurance or guaranty. Under OPA regulations, an owner or operator of more than one tanker is required to demonstrate evidence of financial responsibility for the entire fleet in an amount equal only to the financial responsibility requirement of the tanker having the greatest maximum strict liability under OPA and CERCLA. We have provided such evidence and received certificates of financial responsibility from the U.S. Coast Guard for each of our vessels required to have one.
Other U.S. Environmental Initiatives
The U.S. Clean Water Act, or CWA, prohibits the discharge of oil, hazardous substances and ballast water in U.S. navigable waters unless authorized by a duly-issued permit or exemption, and imposes strict liability in the form of penalties for any unauthorized discharges. The CWA also imposes substantial liability for the costs of removal, remediation and damages and complements the remedies available under OPA and CERCLA. Furthermore, most U.S. states that border a navigable waterway have enacted environmental pollution laws that impose strict liability on a person for removal costs and damages resulting from a discharge of oil or a release of a hazardous substance. These laws may be more stringent than U.S. federal law.
At the international level, the IMO adopted an International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments in February 2004, or the BWM Convention. The Convention's implementing regulations call for a phased introduction of mandatory ballast water exchange requirements, to be replaced in time with mandatory concentration limits. The BWM Convention will not enter into force until 12 months after it has been adopted by 30 states, the combined merchant fleets of which represent not less than 35% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping. The Convention has not yet entered into force because a sufficient number of states have failed to adopt it. However, the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee passed a resolution in March 2010 encouraging the ratification of the Convention and calling upon those countries that have already ratified to encourage the installation of ballast water management systems. If mid-ocean ballast exchange or ballast water treatment requirements become mandatory, the cost of compliance could increase for ocean carriers. Although we do not believe that the costs of compliance with a mandatory mid-ocean ballast exchange would be material, it is difficult to predict the overall impact of such a requirement on our operations.
The U.S. Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 and 1990, or the CAA, requires the EPA to promulgate standards applicable to emissions of volatile organic compounds and other air contaminants. Our vessels are subject to vapor control and recovery requirements for certain cargoes when loading, unloading, ballasting, cleaning and conducting other operations in regulated port areas. Our vessels that operate in such port areas with restricted cargoes are equipped with vapor recovery systems that satisfy these requirements. The CAA also requires states to draft State Implementation Plans, or SIPs, designed to attain national health-based air quality standards in primarily major metropolitan and/or industrial areas. Several SIPs regulate emissions resulting from vessel loading and unloading operations by requiring the installation of vapor control equipment. As indicated above, our vessels operating in covered port areas are already equipped with vapor recovery systems that satisfy these existing requirements.
European Union
The European Union has adopted legislation that would: (1) ban manifestly sub-standard vessels (defined as those over 15 years old that have been detained by port authorities at least twice in a six month period) from European waters and create an obligation of port states to inspect vessels posing a high risk to maritime safety or the marine environment; and (2) provide the European Union with greater authority and control over classification societies, including the ability to seek to suspend or revoke the authority of negligent societies. In addition, European Union regulations enacted in 2003 now prohibit all single hull tankers from entering into its ports or offshore terminals
Greenhouse Gas Regulation
The IMO is evaluating various mandatory measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping, which may include market-based instruments or a carbon tax. Any passage of climate control legislation or other regulatory initiatives by the IMO, EU, the U.S. or other countries where we operate that restrict emissions of greenhouse gases could require us to make significant financial expenditures that we cannot predict with certainty at this time.
Vessel Security Regulations
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there have been a variety of initiatives intended to enhance vessel security including the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, or MTSA, amendments to SOLAS and a requirement that any vessel trading internationally obtain an International Ship Security Certificate from a recognized security organization approved by the vessel's flag state. We believe that our fleet is currently in compliance with applicable security requirements.
Inspection by Classification Societies
Every oceangoing vessel must be "classed" by a classification society. The classification society certifies that the vessel is "in-class," signifying that the vessel has been built and maintained in accordance with the rules of the classification society and complies with applicable rules and regulations of the vessel's country of registry and the international conventions of which that country is a member. In addition, where surveys are required by international conventions and corresponding laws and ordinances of a flag state, the classification society will undertake them on application or by official order, acting on behalf of the authorities concerned.
Most insurance underwriters make it a condition for insurance coverage that a vessel be certified as "in-class" by a classification society which is a member of the International Association of Classification Societies. All our vessels are certified as being "in-class" by a recognized classification society.
Risk of Loss and Insurance
The operation of any ocean-going vessel carries an inherent risk of catastrophic marine disasters and property losses caused by adverse weather conditions, mechanical failures, human error, war, terrorism and other circumstances or events. In addition, the transportation of crude oil is subject to the risk of spills, and business interruptions due to political circumstances in foreign countries, hostilities, labor strikes and boycotts. OPA has made liability insurance more expensive for ship owners and operators imposing potentially unlimited liability upon owners, operators and bareboat charterers for oil pollution incidents in the territorial waters of the United States. We believe that our current insurance coverage is adequate to protect us against the principal accident-related risks that we face in the conduct of our business.
Our protection and indemnity insurance, or P&I insurance, covers third-party liabilities and other related expenses from, among other things, injury or death of crew, passengers and other third parties, claims arising from collisions, damage to cargo and other third-party property and pollution arising from oil or other substances. Our current P&I insurance coverage for pollution is the maximum commercially available amount of $1.0 billion per tanker per incident and is provided by mutual protection and indemnity associations. Each of the vessels currently in our fleet is entered in a protection and indemnity association which is a member of the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Mutual Assurance Associations. The 13 protection and indemnity associations that comprise the International Group insure approximately 90% of the world's commercial tonnage and have entered into a pooling agreement to reinsure each association's liabilities. Each protection and indemnity association has capped its exposure to this pooling agreement at approximately $7.0 billion currently. As a member of protection and indemnity associations, which are, in turn, members of the International Group, we are subject to calls payable to the associations based on its claim records as well as the claim records of all other members of the individual associations and members of the pool of protection and indemnity associations comprising the International Group.
Our hull and machinery insurance covers actual or constructive total loss from covered risks of collision, fire, heavy weather, grounding and engine failure or damages from same. Our war risks insurance covers risks of confiscation, seizure, capture, vandalism, sabotage and other war-related risks. Our loss-of-hire insurance covers loss of revenue at $23,000 per day for Suezmaxes and $30,000 per day for VLCCs for not less than 90 days resulting from an accident covered by the terms of our hull and machinery insurance for each of our vessels, with a fourteen day deductible for OBO vessels and a 60 day deductible for all other Suezmaxes and VLCCs.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
See Exhibit 8.1 for a list of our significant subsidiaries.
D. PROPERTY, PLANTS AND EQUIPMENT
The Company's Vessels
The following table sets forth the fleet that we operated as of December 31, 2010 (including contracted newbuildings not yet delivered):
Vessel
|
Built
|
Approximate Dwt.
|
Construction
|
Flag
|
Type of Employment
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tonnage Owned Directly
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VLCCs
|
|
|
|
|
|
Antares Voyager
|
1998
|
310,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
Phoenix Voyager
|
1999
|
308,500
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Bareboat charter
|
British Pioneer
|
1999
|
307,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Bareboat charter
|
British Progress
|
2000
|
307,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Bareboat charter
|
British Purpose
|
2000
|
307,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Bareboat charter
|
Front Shanghai (1)
|
2006
|
298,500
|
Double-hull
|
HK
|
Spot market
|
Front Kathrine
|
2009
|
297,974
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Queen
|
2009
|
297,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Front Eminence
|
2009
|
321,300
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Front Endurance
|
2009
|
321,300
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Cecilie
|
2010
|
297,000
|
Double-hull
|
HK
|
Spot market
|
Front Signe
|
2010
|
297,000
|
Double-hull
|
HK
|
Spot market
|
Hull J0025 (Newbuilding)
|
2011
|
320,000
|
Double-hull
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
Hull J0026 (Newbuilding)
|
2011
|
320,000
|
Double-hull
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
Hull J0027 (Newbuilding)
|
2012
|
320,000
|
Double-hull
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
Hull J0028 (Newbuilding)
|
2012
|
320,000
|
Double-hull
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
Hull J0106 (Newbuilding)
|
2013
|
320,000
|
Double-hull
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Suezmax Tankers
|
|
|
|
|
|
Front Fighter
|
1994
|
147,048
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Hunter
|
1996
|
146,286
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Alfa
|
1993
|
150,038
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Beta
|
1992
|
135,915
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Delta
|
1993
|
136,055
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Northia
|
2010
|
156,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Naticina
|
2010
|
156,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Front Odin
|
2010
|
156,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Njord
|
2010
|
156,000
|
Double-hull
|
HK
|
Spot market
|
Cygnus Voyager
|
1993
|
157,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Bareboat charter
|
Altair Voyager
|
1993
|
136,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Bareboat charter
|
Sirius Voyager
|
1994
|
156,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Bareboat charter
|
Hull 1161 (Newbuilding)
|
2013
|
157,000
|
Double-hull
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
Hull 1162 (Newbuilding)
|
2013
|
157,000
|
Double-hull
|
n/a
|
n/a
|
Tonnage Chartered in from Ship Finance
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VLCCs
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ticen Sun (2)
|
1991
|
284,000
|
Single-hull
|
SG
|
Bareboat charter
|
Ticen Ocean
|
1991
|
284,000
|
Single-hull
|
PAN
|
Bareboat charter
|
Titan Orion (ex-Front Duke)
|
1992
|
284,000
|
Single-hull
|
SG
|
Bareboat charter
|
Titan Aries (ex-Edinburgh)
|
1993
|
302,000
|
Double-side
|
LIB
|
Bareboat charter
|
Front Ace (2)
|
1993
|
276,000
|
Single-hull
|
LIB
|
Time charter
|
Front Vanguard
|
1998
|
300,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Century
|
1998
|
311,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Champion
|
1998
|
311,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
Ovatella (ex-Front Comanche)
|
1999
|
300,000
|
Double-hull
|
FRA
|
Time charter
|
Golden Victory
|
1999
|
300,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Front Circassia
|
1999
|
306,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Opalia
|
1999
|
302,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Ocana
|
1999
|
300,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Time charter
|
Front Scilla
|
2000
|
303,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Oliva
|
2001
|
299,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Time charter
|
Front Serenade
|
2002
|
299,000
|
Double-hull
|
LIB
|
Time charter
|
Otina
|
2002
|
298,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Time charter
|
Ondina
|
2002
|
299,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Time charter
|
Front Falcon
|
2002
|
309,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
Front Page
|
2002
|
299,000
|
Double-hull
|
LIB
|
Time charter
|
Front Energy
|
2004
|
305,000
|
Double-hull
|
CYP
|
Time charter
|
Onoba (ex-Front Force)
|
2004
|
305,000
|
Double-hull
|
CYP
|
Time charter
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Suezmax OBO Carriers
|
|
|
|
|
|
Front Breaker
|
1991
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Front Climber
|
1991
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
SG
|
Time charter
|
Front Driver
|
1991
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Front Guider
|
1991
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
SG
|
Time charter
|
Front Leader (3)
|
1991
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
SG
|
Time charter
|
Front Rider
|
1992
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
SG
|
Time charter
|
Front Striver
|
1992
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
SG
|
Time charter
|
Front Viewer
|
1992
|
169,000
|
Double-hull
|
SG
|
Time charter
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Suezmax Tankers
|
|
|
|
|
|
Front Pride
|
1993
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Glory
|
1995
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Splendour
|
1995
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Ardenne
|
1997
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Front Brabant
|
1998
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Time charter
|
Mindanao
|
1998
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
SG
|
Time charter
|
Tonnage Chartered in from
Third Parties
|
|
|
|
|
|
VLCCs
|
|
|
|
|
|
Front Chief
|
1999
|
311,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
Front Commander
|
1999
|
311,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
Front Crown
|
1999
|
311,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
British Pride
|
2000
|
307,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Bareboat charter
|
Front Tina
|
2000
|
299,000
|
Double-hull
|
LIB
|
Spot market
|
Front Commodore
|
2000
|
299,000
|
Double-hull
|
LIB
|
Spot charter
|
Front Eagle (4)
|
2002
|
309,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
Hampstead
|
1996
|
298,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Spot market
|
Kensington
|
1995
|
298,000
|
Double-hull
|
IoM
|
Spot market
|
Desh Ujaala (5)
|
2005
|
316,217
|
Double-hull
|
India
|
Spot market
|
Suezmax Tankers
|
|
|
|
|
|
Front Warrior
|
1998
|
153,000
|
Double-hull
|
BA
|
Spot market
|
Front Melody
|
2001
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
LIB
|
Spot market
|
Front Symphony
|
2001
|
150,000
|
Double-hull
|
LIB
|
Spot charter
|
Tonnage under Commercial Management
VLCCs
|
|
|
|
|
|
Saga Chelsea
|
1995
|
298,432
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Saga Julie
|
2000
|
299,089
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
Saga Unity
|
2000
|
300,000
|
Double-hull
|
MI
|
Spot market
|
(1) Vessel was sold in January 2011 and chartered back in for approximately two years. The vessel was renamed Gulf Eyadah and changed to the Panama flag.
(2) Agreement reached in February 2011 regarding termination of the lease. Termination occurred in March 2011.
(3) Agreement reached in April 2011 regarding termination of the lease. Termination is expected to occur in the second quarter of 2011.
(4) Vessel was acquired in March 2011 when our purchase option was exercised and simultaneously sold. Delivery to the new buyer is expected to take place in the second quarter of 2011.
(5) Vessel was redelivered in January 2011.
Our chartered in fleet is contracted to us under leasing arrangements with fixed terms of between seven and twenty-three years. Lessors have options to extend six of these leases by up to an additional five years from expiry of the initial fixed term. We have fixed purchase price options to buy six of these vessels at certain future dates and the lessors have fixed options to sell six of these vessels to us at the end of the lease period. Four of the lease agreements may not be terminated by us without the agreement of the end-user of the vessel.
Key to Flags:
BA – Bahamas, IoM – Isle of Man, LIB - Liberia, MAL – Malta, NIS - Norwegian International Ship Register, PAN – Panama, SG - Singapore, FRA – France, MI – Marshall Islands, CYP – Cyprus, HK – Hong Kong.
Other than our interests in the vessels described above, we do not own any material physical properties. We lease office space in Hamilton, Bermuda from an unaffiliated third party. Frontline Management AS leases office space, at market rates, in Oslo, Norway from Bryggegata AS, a company indirectly affiliated with Hemen, our principal shareholder.
ITEM 4A. UNRESOLVED STAFF COMMENTS
None.
ITEM 5. OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW AND PROSPECTS
Overview
The following discussion should be read in conjunction with Item 3 "Selected Financial Data", Item 4 "Information on the Company" and our audited Consolidated Financial Statements and Notes thereto included herein.
As of December 31, 2010, our tanker and OBO fleet consisted of 73 vessels. The fleet consists of 44 VLCCs which are either owned or chartered in, 21 Suezmax tankers which are either owned or chartered in and eight Suezmax OBOs which are chartered in. We also had five VLCC newbuildings and two Suezmax newbuildings on order and three VLCCs under our commercial management.
A full fleet list is provided in Item 4.D. "Information on the Company" showing the vessels that we currently own and charter in.
Fleet Changes
Refer to Item 4 for discussion on acquisitions and disposals of vessels. A summary of our fleet changes for the years ended December 31, 2010, 2009 and 2008 is as follows:
|
|
2010
|
|
|
2009
|
|
|
2008
|
|
VLCCs
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At start of period
|
|
|
41
|
|
|
|
40
|
|
|
|
42
|
|
Acquisitions
|
|
|
4
|
|
|
|
2
|
|
|
|
—
|
|
Dispositions
|
|
|
(2
|
)
|
|
|
(1
|
)
|
|
|
(2
|
)
|
Chartered In
|
|
|
1
|
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
|
—
|
|
At end of period
|
|
|
44
|
|
|
|
41
|
|
|
|
40
|
|
Suezmax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At start of period
|
|
|
27
|
|
|
|
29
|
|
|
|
16
|
|
Acquisitions
|
|
|
4
|
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
|
5
|
|
Dispositions
|
|
|
(1
|
)
|
|
|
—
|
|
|
|
(3
|
)
|
Chartered In
|
|
|
(9
|
)
|
|
|
(2
|
)
|
|
|
11
|
|
At end of period
|
|
|
21
|
|
|
|
27
|
|
|
|
29
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Suezmax OBOs
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At start and end of period
|
|
|
8
|
|
|
|
8
|
|
|
|
8
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total fleet
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
At start of period
|
|
|
76
|
|
|
|
77
|
|
|
|
66
|
|
Acquisitions
|
|
|
8
|
|
|
|
2
|
|
|
|
5
|
|
Dispositions
|
|
|
(3
|
)
|
|
|
(1
|
)
|
|
|
(5
|
)
|
Chartered In
|
|
|
(8
|
)
|
|
|
(2
|
)
|
|
|
11
|
|
At end of period
|
|
|
73
|
|
|
|
76
|
|
|
|
77
|
|
Summary of Fleet Employment
As discussed below, our vessels are operated under time charters, bareboat charters, voyage charters, pool arrangements and COAs.
|
|
As of December 31,
|
|
|
|
2010
|
|
|
2009
|
|
|
2008
|
|
|
|
Number of vessels
|
|
Percentage of fleet
|
|
|
Number of vessels
|
|
Percentage
of fleet
|
|
|
Number of vessels
|
|
Percentage of fleet
|
|
VLCCs
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Spot or pool
|
|
22
|
|
50
|
%
|
|
15
|
|
37
|
%
|
|
15
|
|
38
|
%
|
Time charter
|
|
13
|
|
30
|
%
|
|
14
|
|
34
|
%
|
|
15
|
|
38
|
%
|
Bareboat charter
|
|
9
|
|
20
|
%
|
|
12
|
|
29
|
%
|
|
10
|
|
25
|
%
|
Total
|
|
44
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
41
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
40
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Suezmax
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Spot or pool
|
|
15
|
|
72
|
%
|
|
19
|
|
70
|
%
|
|
21
|
|
73
|
%
|
Time charter
|
|
3
|
|
14
|
%
|
|
5
|
|
19
|
%
|
|
5
|
|
17
|
%
|
Bareboat charter
|
|
3
|
|
14
|
%
|
|
3
|
|
11
|
%
|
|
3
|
|
10
|
%
|
Total
|
|
21
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
27
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
29
|
|
100
|
%
|
Suezmax OBOs
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Time charter
|
|
8
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
8
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
8
|
|
100
|
%
|
Total
|
|
8
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
8
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
8
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total fleet
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Spot or pool
|
|
37
|
|
51
|
%
|
|
34
|
|
45
|
%
|
|
36
|
|
47
|
%
|
Time charter
|
|
24
|
|
33
|
%
|
|
27
|
|
35
|
%
|
|
28
|
|
36
|
%
|
Bareboat charter
|
|
12
|
|
16
|
%
|
|
15
|
|
20
|
%
|
|
13
|
|
17
|
%
|
Total
|
|
73
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
76
|
|
100
|
%
|
|
77
|
|
100
|
%
|
Market Overview and Trend Information
Tanker Market
According to industry sources, the average TCE rate for a modern VLCC was $42,500 per day in 2010. The tanker market in 2010 was characterized by a strong first half and a weak second half. Storage activities and delays in the newbuilding delivery schedule contributed positively to the first half of the year and the year started rather strongly with average earnings of $60,000 per day in the first quarter and $58,000 per day in the second quarter. The second half of the year returned lower earnings per day mostly due to the lack of vessels being used as floating storage and the high availability of tonnage. Consequently the average TCE for the third and the fourth quarter was $26,000 and $27,500 per day respectively.
The removal of single hulled vessels throughout the year was modest and below most expectations. However, due to their trading restrictions interference with the more modern tonnage was rather limited. Furthermore, a large increase in world oil demand helped the continued growth throughout the year of the seaborne oil trade. Industry sources indicate a 4% growth in the volume of seaborne oil trade and a 3% increase in transport distances. China maintained its imports from West Africa, and thus continues to be one of the most important participants to the large tanker market and a main contributor to what industry sources estimate was a 7% ton-mile increase in 2010.
The VLCC fleet increased by approximately 7.5% in 2010 to 548 vessels. Throughout the year, a total of 55 new vessels were delivered to owners and 51 new orders were placed. The total order book consisted of 185 vessels at the end of the year, representing 34% of the existing fleet.
Throughout 2011, it is estimated that 79 new VLCCs will enter the market, including 25 in the first quarter. In 2010 industry sources expected that 67 VLCCs would be delivered, however only 55 were actually delivered. This resulted in 19% slippage for the year and the trend is expected to continue throughout 2011. Furthermore, there are still single hull vessels trading actively. The phase out program has not yet been completed and the fleet counted 43
non-double hull VLCCs at the end of 2010. Not all of these vessels are trading actively and it is likely that the majority will be either sold for scrap, demolished or converted by the end of 2011.
The Suezmax fleet increased by approximately 6.5% in 2010 to 409 vessels. Throughout 2010, a total of 37 new vessels were delivered to owners and 59 new orders were placed. The total order book consisted of 147 vessels at the end of 2010, representing 36% of the existing fleet.
Throughout 2011, it is estimated that 62 new Suezmaxes will enter the market, including 24 in the first quarter. In 2010, industry sources expected that 61 Suezmaxes would be delivered, while only 37 were delivered. This resulted in 39% slippage for the year and the trend is expected to continue throughout 2011. Furthermore, there are still single hull vessels trading actively. The phase out program has not yet been completed and the fleet counted 14 non-double hull Suezmaxes at the end of 2010. Not all of them are trading actively and it is likely that the majority will be either sold for scrap, demolished or converted by the end of 2011.
According to the February 2011 report from the International Energy Agency, or "IEA", average OPEC production is estimated at 29.2 million barrels per day in 2010. The expected 2011 OPEC production output figure has not yet been published by the IEA. However, the IEA estimates a production figure of about 29.9 million barrels per day for January 2011, which is approximately 800.000 barrels per day more compared to the production output in January 2010.
The IEA further estimates that the average world oil demand was 87.8 million barrels per day in 2010, which represents an increase of 3.3% or 2.85 million barrels per day from 2009. For 2011, the world oil demand is estimated at 89.3 million barrels per day, representing an increase of 1.7% or 1.46 million barrels per day from 2010.
The bunker (vessel fuel oil) market followed movements in the oil market closely in 2010. The average bunker price in Fujairah was approximately $465/mt in 2010, which represents an increase of $95/mt from 2009. The prices ranged from a low of $422/mt at the beginning of July to a high of $512/mt at the end of December.
According to the 'World Economic Outlook - Update' published by The International Monetary Fund, or "IMF", in January 2011, World Output, or GDP, increased 5 % in 2010, which was a substantial upward shift compared to the 2009 -0.6% growth. For 2011 and 2012 the IMF forecasts World GDP growth of 4.4% and 4.5%, respectively.
Drybulk Market
In spite of a net fleet growth of 76 million dwt or 14% of the existing fleet and slightly lower iron ore imports to China, average earnings for the entire fleet were generally at the same level as for 2009. But there were big differences in earnings between the sizes which reflect the influx of newbuildings. As many as 205 Capesize vessels were delivered in 2010 or a net fleet growth of 23%, while the Handysize segment in comparison had a net fleet growth of 8%. In combination with lower volumes of long haul shipments of iron ore from Brazil to Asia, the charter rates for Capesize vessels declined and from time to time they earned less than the smaller sizes.
Outside the normal supply and demand balance there are a few reasons why the utilization of the dry bulk fleet was well supported.
|
·
|
Chinese coastal trade is growing fast and may account for as much as 6% of total dry bulk trade
|
|
·
|
Waiting time at load and discharge ports was tying up between 5 and 9% of the total fleet during 2010.
|
|
·
|
There was inefficient utilization of the fleet due to the fact that a continuously larger portion of the dry bulk fleet discharges in Asia and must sail without cargo back to loading areas in the Western hemisphere. In addition piracy in Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean is adding waiting time for military convoys, slower steaming during convoy passages and deviations in general.
|
As reported by the Baltic Exchange, the average time charter earnings for a Panamax vessel was $18,203 per day during the fourth quarter of 2010 and average time charter earnings for a Capesize vessel was $34,424 per day for the same period.
The total dry bulk fleet grew by 15.7% year on year during fourth quarter 2010 and 3.8% compared to the previous quarter. There is a substantial gap between the official order book and what is actually being delivered. About 67% of the official order book was delivered during 2010.
Furthermore, the IMF reported a U.S. GDP increase of 2.8% for 2010, which was an upward shift from the 2009 decrease of 2.6%. For 2011 and 2012 the IMF forecasts a U.S. GDP increase of 3% and 2.7% respectively.
Germany, France, Italy and Spain in Europe and Japan experienced an increase in GDP for 2010 of 1.8% and 4.3%, respectively, and these countries are also forecast to report GDP growth for both 2011 and 2012.
The emerging and developing economies increased their GDP by 7.1% for 2010, compared with a growth of 2.6% for 2009. For 2011 and 2012 the IMF forecasts a continued increase in GDP of 6.5% for both years.
China yet again surpassed massive growth in GDP experienced in past years and according to the IMF, GDP increased by 10.3% in 2010, which was 1.1% higher as compared with 2009. For 2011 and 2012, the forecast is slightly lower with expected growth of 9.6% and 9.5%, respectively.
Critical Accounting Policies and Estimates
The preparation of our financial statements in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States requires that management make estimates and assumptions affecting the reported amounts of assets and liabilities and disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at the date of the financial statements and the reported amounts of revenues and expenses during the reporting period.
Management believes that the following accounting policies are the most critical in fully understanding and evaluating our reported financial results as they require a higher degree of judgment in their application resulting from the need to make estimates about the effect of matters that are inherently uncertain. See Note 2 to our audited Consolidated Financial Statements included herein for details of all of our material accounting policies.
Revenue and expense recognition
Revenues and expenses are recognized on the accruals basis. Revenues are generated from freight billings, time charter and bareboat charter hires. Voyage revenues and expenses are recognized ratably over the estimated length of each voyage and, therefore, are allocated between reporting periods based on the relative transit time in each period. The impact of recognizing voyage expenses ratably over the length of each voyage is not materially different on a quarterly and annual basis from a method of recognizing such costs as incurred. Probable losses on voyages are provided for in full at the time such losses can be estimated. Time charter and bareboat charter revenues are recorded over the term of the charter as service is provided. The Company uses a discharge-to-discharge basis in determining percentage of completion for all spot voyages and voyages servicing contracts of affreightment whereby it recognizes revenue ratably from when product is discharged (unloaded) at the end of one voyage to when it is discharged after the next voyage. However, the Company does not recognize revenue if a charter has not been contractually committed to by a customer and the Company, even if the vessel has discharged its cargo and is sailing to the anticipated load port on its next voyage.
Amounts receivable or payable arising from profit sharing arrangements are accrued based on amounts earned as of the reporting date. Profit share income represents vessel earnings earned by the Company's customers in excess of market rates. Profit share expense represents amounts due to Ship Finance based on 20% of the excess of vessel revenues earned by the Company over the base hire paid to Ship Finance for chartering in the vessels.
Revenues and voyage expenses of the vessels operating in pool arrangements are pooled and the resulting net pool revenues, calculated on a time charter equivalent basis, are allocated to the pool participants according to an agreed formula. Formulae used to allocate net pool revenues vary among different pools but generally allocate revenues to pool participants on the basis of the number of days a vessel operates in the pool with weighting adjustments made to reflect vessels' differing capacities and performance capabilities. The same revenue and expense principles stated above are applied in determining the pool's net pool revenues. Certain pools are responsible for paying voyage expenses and distribute net pool revenues to the participants. Certain pools require the participants to pay and account for voyage expenses, and distribute gross pool revenues to the participants such that the participants' resulting net pool revenues are equal to net pool revenues calculated according to the agreed formula. Revenues allocated by these pools are included in voyage revenues in the consolidated statements of operations.
Vessels and equipment
The cost of the vessels less estimated residual value is depreciated on a straight-line basis over the vessels' estimated remaining economic useful lives. The estimated economic useful life of the Company's double hull vessels is 25 years and for single hull vessels is either 25 years or the vessel's anniversary date in 2015, whichever comes first. Other equipment is depreciated over its estimated remaining useful life, which approximates five years.
On July 1, 2009, the Company effected a change in estimate related to the estimated scrap rate for all of its owned vessels and for leased vessels where the Company has an interest in the residual value. The scrap rate was amended from an average of $222 per lightweight ton to $281 per lightweight ton for VLCCs and from an average of $378 per lightweight ton to $281 per lightweight ton for Suezmaxes. The resulting change in salvage values has been applied prospectively and reduced depreciation by approximately $0.1 million for the six months ended December 31, 2009. This change also resulted in an increase in net income of approximately $0.1 million with no impact in earnings per share for the year ended December 31, 2009. The Company's assumptions used in the determination of estimated salvage value took into account then current scrap prices, the historic pattern of scrap rates over the ten years ended December 31, 2008, estimated changes in future market demand for scrap steel and estimated future demand for vessels. Management believes that $281 per lightweight ton is a reasonable estimate of future scrap prices, taking into consideration the cyclicality of the nature of future demand for scrap steel. Although management believes that the assumptions used to determine the scrap rate are reasonable and appropriate, such assumptions are highly subjective, in part, because of the cyclicality of the nature of future demand for scrap steel.
Vessel Impairment
The carrying values of the Company's vessels may not represent their fair market value at any point in time since the market prices of second-hand vessels tend to fluctuate with changes in charter rates and the cost of newbuildings. Historically, both charter rates and vessel values tend to be cyclical. The carrying amounts of vessels held and used by the Company are reviewed for potential impairment whenever events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount of a particular vessel may not be fully recoverable. In such instances, an impairment charge would be recognized if the estimate of the undiscounted future cash flows expected to result from the use of the vessel and its eventual disposition is less than the vessel's carrying amount. This assessment is made at the individual vessel level as separately identifiable cash flow information for each vessel is available.
In developing estimates of future cash flows, the Company must make assumptions about future charter rates, ship operating expenses, and the estimated remaining useful lives of the vessels. These assumptions are based on historical trends as well as future expectations. Although management believes that the assumptions used to evaluate potential impairment are reasonable and appropriate, such assumptions are highly subjective.
Our Fleet – Comparison of Possible Excess of Carrying Value Over Estimated Charter-Free Market Value of Certain Vessels
In "Critical Accounting Policies – Vessel Impairment" we discuss our policy for impairing the carrying values of our vessels. During the past few years, the market values of vessels have experienced particular volatility, with substantial declines in many vessel classes. As a result, the charter-free market value, or basic market value, of certain of our vessels may have declined below those vessels' carrying value, even though we did not impair those vessels' carrying value under our accounting impairment policy, due to our belief that future undiscounted cash flows expected to be earned by such vessels over their operating lives would exceed such vessels' carrying amounts.
Our estimates of basic market value assume that our vessels are all in good and seaworthy condition without need for repair and, if inspected, would be certified in class without notations of any kind. Our estimates are based on the estimated market values for our vessels that we have received from shipbrokers and are inherently uncertain. In addition, vessel values are highly volatile; as such, our estimates may not be indicative of the current or future basic market value of our vessels or prices that we could achieve if we were to sell them.
The table set forth below indicates (i) the carrying value of each of our owned vessels as of December 31, 2010, (ii) which of those vessels we believe has a basic market value, based on shipbroker reports, below its carrying value, and (iii) the aggregate difference between carrying value and market value represented by such vessels. We believe that the future undiscounted cash flows expected to be earned by those vessels, which have experienced a decline in charter-free market value below such vessels' carrying value, over their operating lives would exceed such vessels' carrying values as of December 31, 2010, and accordingly, have not recorded an impairment charge. As of December 31, 2010, and the date of this annual report, we are not holding any of the vessels listed in the table below as held for sale.
Vessel
|
Built
|
Approximate
Dwt.
|
Carrying
Value
($ millions)
|
VLCCs
|
|
|
|
Antares Voyager
|
1998
|
310,000
|
49.4
|
Phoenix Voyager
|
1999
|
308,500
|
50.6
|
British Pioneer
|
1999
|
307,000
|
52.3
|
British Progress
|
2000
|
307,000
|
53.9
|
British Purpose
|
2000
|
307,000
|
54.5
|
Front Shanghai (1)
|
2006
|
298,500
|
69.7
|
Front Kathrine
|
2009
|
297,974
|
102.5
|
Front Queen (2)
|
2009
|
297,000
|
104.0
|
Front Eminence
|
2009
|
321,300
|
101.3
|
Front Endurance
|
2009
|
321,300
|
101.7
|
Front Cecilie (2)
|
2010
|
297,000
|
111.9
|
Front Signe (2)
|
2010
|
297,000
|
113.0
|
Suezmax Tankers
|
|
|
|
Front Fighter (2)
|
1994
|
147,048
|
42.4
|
Front Hunter (2)
|
1996
|
146,286
|
50.3
|
Front Alfa (2)
|
1993
|
150,038
|
40.4
|
Front Beta (2)
|
1992
|
135,915
|
34.5
|
Front Delta (2)
|
1993
|
136,055
|
31.9
|
Northia
|
2010
|
156,000
|
65.4
|
Naticina
|
2010
|
|